BMP, GIF, WAV, RAW, RAW\_PADDED, CSV and PROTO formats. All other input formats,
including tensorflow-io should be sandboxed if used to process untrusted data.

For example, if an attacker were to upload a malicious video file, they could
potentially exploit a vulnerability in the TensorFlow code that handles videos,
which could allow them to execute arbitrary code on the system running
TensorFlow.

import java.util.zip.ZipEntry
import java.util.zip.ZipOutputStream


class ZipTest : TestWithTempFiles() {

    @Test
    fun `unzip fails on path traversal attempts`() {

        val maliciousZip = file("malicious.zip").apply {
            ZipOutputStream(outputStream()).use { zip ->
                val content = "suspicious".toByteArray()

     * and gives an attacker the ability to
     * <a href="https://max.computer/blog/how-to-take-over-the-computer-of-any-java-or-clojure-or-scala-developer/">serve malicious executable code onto the system.</a>
     * </b>
     * <p>
     * See also:

        Throwable locationAware = null;
        Throwable result = null;
        Throwable contextMatch = null;
        // Guard against malicious overrides of Throwable.equals by
        // using a Set with identity equality semantics.
        Set<Throwable> dejaVu = Collections.newSetFromMap(new IdentityHashMap<>());

//   - the value of the annotation isn't parsable as int - for example because
//     it was set by a malicious user,
//   - the value of the annotation is negative or greater by int32 - for example
//     because it was set by a malicious user.
func getIndexFailureCount(logger klog.Logger, pod *v1.Pod) int32 {
	return parseIndexFailureCountAnnotation(logger, pod)
}

    otherwise. Do not persist these and assume they can be read by a future
    version of the library.

5.  Our classes are not designed to protect against a malicious caller. You
    should not use them for communication between trusted and untrusted code.

6.  For the mainline flavor, we test the libraries using OpenJDK 8, 11, and 17

     * and gives an attacker the ability to
     * <a href="https://max.computer/blog/how-to-take-over-the-computer-of-any-java-or-clojure-or-scala-developer/">serve malicious executable code onto the system.</a>
     * </b>
     * <p>
     * See also:

	// entries to the cache for up to this TTL before the GC logic starts deleting old entries.  Each
	// entry is ~300 bytes in size, so even a malicious client will be bounded in the overall memory
	// it can consume.
	cacheTTL = 10 * time.Minute

	derivedKeySizeExtendedNonceGCM = commonSize
	infoSizeExtendedNonceGCM
	MinSeedSizeExtendedNonceGCM
)

        // If we have the real hash of a JAR in those other coordinates, Gradle could overwrite and replace the real JAR with a malicious one
        !invalidLocation.exists()
    }

    def 'cannot write cache entries outside of dependency cache'() {
        given:
        def fakeDep = temporaryFolder.testDirectory.file('fake-repo/pwned.txt')

		switch strings.TrimSpace(p) {
		case dotdotComponent:
			return true
		case dotComponent:
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// Check if client is sending a malicious request.
func hasMultipleAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	authTypeCount := 0
	for _, hasValidAuth := range []func(*http.Request) bool{
		isRequestSignatureV2, isRequestPresignedSignatureV2,