echo \"Failed attempts: $ATTEMPTS\" ;
    if [ $ATTEMPTS -gt $LIMIT ]; then
      exit 1 ;
    fi ;
    sleep 2 ; # 2 second intervals between attempts
    $MC_COMMAND ;
    STATUS=$? ;
  done ;
  set -e ; # reset `e` as active
  return 0
}

# checkSvcacctExists ()
# Check if the svcacct exists, by using the exit code of `mc admin user svcacct info`
checkSvcacctExists() {

```

> *"An emptyDir volume is first created when a Pod is assigned to a Node, and exists as long as that Pod is running on that node. When a Pod is removed from a node for any reason, the data in the emptyDir is deleted forever."*

### Existing PersistentVolumeClaim

If a Persistent Volume Claim already exists, specify it during installation.

1. Create the PersistentVolume
2. Create the PersistentVolumeClaim

# Ensure bucket exists, purging if asked to
createBucket() {
	BUCKET=$1
	POLICY=$2
	PURGE=$3
	VERSIONING=$4
	OBJECTLOCKING=$5

	# Purge the bucket, if set & exists
	# Since PURGE is user input, check explicitly for `true`
	if [ $PURGE = true ]; then
		if checkBucketExists $BUCKET; then
			echo "Purging bucket '$BUCKET'."
			set +e # don't exit if this fails
			${MC} rm -r --force myminio/$BUCKET

Based on the description mentioned above, a MinIO engineer or security team
member investigates:

- Whether the reported vulnerability exists.
- The conditions that are required such that the vulnerability can be exploited.
- The steps required to fix the vulnerability.

In general, if the vulnerability exists in one of the MinIO code bases
itself - not in a code dependency - then MinIO will, if possible, fix

| xlMetaInlineDataVer | byte                        | version identifier
| id -> data          | msgp `map[string][]byte`      | Map of string id -> byte content

Currently only xlMetaInlineDataVer == 1 exists.

```sh
docker run \
  -p 9000:9000 \
  -p 9001:9001 \
  -e "MINIO_ROOT_USER=AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE" \
  -e "MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD=wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY" \

- `context_values`: are values like the bucket and object name and other information which should be cryptographically bound to the KEK.

To summarize for any encrypted object there exists (at least) three different keys:

- [OEK](#oek): A secret and unique key used to encrypted the object, stored in an encrypted form as part of the object metadata and only loaded to RAM in plaintext during en/decrypting the object.

    echo \"Failed attempts: $ATTEMPTS\" ;
    if [ $ATTEMPTS -gt $LIMIT ]; then
      exit 1 ;
    fi ;
    sleep 2 ; # 1 second intervals between attempts
    $MC_COMMAND ;
    STATUS=$? ;
  done ;
  set -e ; # reset `e` as active
  return 0
}

# checkPolicyExists ($policy)
# Check if the policy exists, by using the exit code of `mc admin policy info`
checkPolicyExists() {
  POLICY=$1

    echo \"Failed attempts: $ATTEMPTS\" ;
    if [ $ATTEMPTS -gt $LIMIT ]; then
      exit 1 ;
    fi ;
    sleep 2 ; # 1 second intervals between attempts
    $MC_COMMAND ;
    STATUS=$? ;
  done ;
  set -e ; # reset `e` as active
  return 0
}

# checkUserExists ()
# Check if the user exists, by using the exit code of `mc admin user info`
checkUserExists() {

client can use now `mybucket.domain.com` to directly resolve itself to the right cluster. `MINIO_PUBLIC_IPS`
points to the public IP address where each cluster might be accessible, this is unique for each cluster.

NOTE: `mybucket` only exists on one cluster either `cluster1` or `cluster2` this is random and
is decided by how `domain.com` gets resolved, if there is a round-robin DNS on `domain.com` then
it is randomized which cluster might provision the bucket.