assertTrue(result.toString().contains("example.com"));
        assertTrue(result.toString().contains("path"));
        assertTrue(result.toString().endsWith("page.html"));
    }

    // --- path traversal prevention tests ---

    @Test
    public void test_buildFilePath_dotDotTraversal() {
        final Path result =

    volatile int count;

    /**
     * Number of updates that alter the size of the table. This is used during bulk-read methods to
     * make sure they see a consistent snapshot: If modCounts change during a traversal of segments
     * computing size or checking containsValue, then we might have an inconsistent view of state so
     * (usually) must retry.
     */
    int modCount;

    /**

 * System.out.println(new URI(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(HttpUrl.parse(attack).encodedPath());
 * ```
 *
 * By canonicalizing the input paths, they are complicit in directory traversal attacks. Code that
 * checks only the path prefix may suffer!
 *
 * ```
 * /static/images/../../../../../etc/passwd
 * /static/images/../../../../../etc/passwd
 * /etc/passwd
 * ```
 *

    volatile int count;

    /**
     * Number of updates that alter the size of the table. This is used during bulk-read methods to
     * make sure they see a consistent snapshot: If modCounts change during a traversal of segments
     * computing size or checking containsValue, then we might have an inconsistent view of state so
     * (usually) must retry.
     */
    int modCount;

    /**