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Results 1 - 10 of 34 for Traversal (0.05 seconds)
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android/guava/src/com/google/common/graph/Traverser.java
*/ private abstract static class Traversal<N> { final SuccessorsFunction<N> successorFunction; Traversal(SuccessorsFunction<N> successorFunction) { this.successorFunction = successorFunction; } static <N> Traversal<N> inGraph(SuccessorsFunction<N> graph) { Set<N> visited = new HashSet<>(); return new Traversal<N>(graph) { @OverrideCreated: Fri Apr 03 12:43:13 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Wed Mar 11 01:10:31 GMT 2026 - 19.3K bytes - Click Count (0) -
src/test/java/org/codelibs/fess/app/web/admin/design/AdminDesignActionTest.java
// Test simple path traversal attack File baseDir = new File(tempDir.toFile(), "images"); baseDir.mkdirs(); File maliciousFile = new File(baseDir, "../../../etc/passwd"); Boolean result = invokeIsValidUploadPath(maliciousFile, baseDir); assertFalse("Path traversal with ../ should be blocked", result); } @TestCreated: Tue Mar 31 13:07:34 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Wed Jan 14 14:29:07 GMT 2026 - 13.6K bytes - Click Count (0) -
android/guava/src/com/google/common/collect/TreeTraverser.java
/** * Returns an unmodifiable iterable over the nodes in a tree structure, using pre-order traversal. * That is, each node's subtrees are traversed after the node itself is returned. * * <p>No guarantees are made about the behavior of the traversal when nodes change while iteration * is in progress or when the iterators generated by {@link #children} are advanced. *
Created: Fri Apr 03 12:43:13 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Tue Sep 23 18:39:06 GMT 2025 - 8.3K bytes - Click Count (0) -
src/main/java/org/codelibs/fess/app/web/admin/design/AdminDesignAction.java
} expectedBaseDir = null; // Skip path traversal check for resource files } else { throwValidationError(messages -> messages.addErrorsDesignFileIsUnsupportedType("designFileName"), this::asListHtml); return null; } // Validate path to prevent path traversal attacksCreated: Tue Mar 31 13:07:34 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Fri Jan 23 23:57:26 GMT 2026 - 20.1K bytes - Click Count (0) -
src/main/java/org/codelibs/core/io/FileUtil.java
/** * Validates that a given path is safe and does not attempt path traversal attacks. * <p> * This method checks if the resolved absolute path starts with the allowed base directory, * preventing access to files outside the intended directory through path traversal * techniques like "../../../etc/passwd". * </p> * <p> * Example usage: * </p>Created: Fri Apr 03 20:58:12 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Thu Feb 12 12:10:45 GMT 2026 - 13.2K bytes - Click Count (0) -
android/guava/src/com/google/common/graph/Graphs.java
* list the nodes reachable from a given node or nodes. See the <a * href="https://github.com/google/guava/wiki/GraphsExplained#Graph-traversal">"Graph traversal" * section of the Guava User's Guide</a> for more information. * * <p>The {@link Set} returned is a "snapshot" based on the current topology of {@code graph},
Created: Fri Apr 03 12:43:13 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Wed Mar 11 01:10:31 GMT 2026 - 24.4K bytes - Click Count (0) -
src/main/java/org/codelibs/fess/app/web/admin/log/AdminLogAction.java
return redirect(getClass()); // no-op } /** * Sanitizes a filename by removing path traversal sequences and whitespace. * * @param filename the filename to sanitize * @return the sanitized filename */ public static String sanitizeFilename(final String filename) {
Created: Tue Mar 31 13:07:34 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Fri Jan 23 23:57:26 GMT 2026 - 5.8K bytes - Click Count (0) -
README.md
- **I/O Operations** (`org.codelibs.core.io`) - File handling, resource management, stream utilities, and traversal utilities for efficient resource processing - **Reflection** (`org.codelibs.core.lang`) - Class loading, method/field access, type introspection utilities, and generics support
Created: Fri Apr 03 20:58:12 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Sun Aug 31 02:56:02 GMT 2025 - 12.7K bytes - Click Count (0) -
src/main/java/org/codelibs/fess/job/IndexExportJob.java
Files.createDirectories(filePath.getParent()); final Path realParent = filePath.getParent().toRealPath(); if (!realParent.startsWith(realBase)) { logger.warn("Symlink traversal detected: url={}, realParent={}, realBase={}", url, realParent, realBase); return; } final byte[] bytes = content.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Created: Tue Mar 31 13:07:34 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Thu Mar 26 02:24:08 GMT 2026 - 10.8K bytes - Click Count (0) -
src/test/java/org/codelibs/core/io/FileUtilTest.java
} /** * Test isPathSafe with path traversal attempt * * @throws Exception */ @Test public void testIsPathSafe_PathTraversalAttempt() throws Exception { final Path baseDir = tempFolder.getRoot().toPath(); final Path traversalPath = baseDir.resolve("../../../etc/passwd"); assertFalse("Path traversal should be blocked", FileUtil.isPathSafe(traversalPath, baseDir));Created: Fri Apr 03 20:58:12 GMT 2026 - Last Modified: Sat Nov 22 11:21:59 GMT 2025 - 10.3K bytes - Click Count (0)