benchmarkMutex(b, true, true)
}

func BenchmarkMutexNoSpin(b *testing.B) {
	b.ResetTimer()
	b.ReportAllocs()

	// This benchmark models a situation where spinning in the mutex should be
	// non-profitable and allows to confirm that spinning does not do harm.
	// To achieve this we create excess of goroutines most of which do local work.
	// These goroutines yield during local work, so that switching from

  //   have observed 12 micros on 64-bit linux systems to wake up a parked thread). So if the
  //   timeout is small we shouldn't park(). This needs to be traded off with the cpu overhead of
  //   spinning, so we use SPIN_THRESHOLD_NANOS which is what AbstractQueuedSynchronizer uses for
  //   similar purposes.
  // * We want to behave reasonably for timeouts of 0

 *
 * ## Warning: Certificate Pinning is Dangerous!
 *
 * Pinning certificates limits your server team's abilities to update their TLS certificates. By
 * pinning certificates, you take on additional operational complexity and limit your ability to
 * migrate between certificate authorities. Do not use certificate pinning without the blessing of
 * your server's TLS administrator!
 *

    // rogue CA is trusted) but it should fail certificate pinning.
    val request =
      Request
        .Builder()
        .url(server.url("/"))
        .build()
    val call = client.newCall(request)
    assertFailsWith<SSLPeerUnverifiedException> {
      call.execute()
    }.also { expected ->
      // Certificate pinning fails!

        // Then
        assertNotNull(signingKey, "Signing key should not be null");
        assertEquals(16, signingKey.length, "Signing key should be 16 bytes");
        assertFalse(Arrays.equals(sessionKey, signingKey), "Signing key should be different from session key");
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Should derive signing key for SMB 3.1.1 dialect")
    void testDeriveSigningKey_SMB311() {
        // Given

import jcifs.internal.SMBSigningDigest;
import jcifs.internal.util.SMBUtil;
import jcifs.util.Crypto;

/**
 * SMB2/SMB3 message signing digest implementation.
 *
 * This class handles cryptographic signing of SMB2/SMB3 messages to ensure
 * message integrity and authenticity. It supports different signing algorithms
 * used in various SMB2/SMB3 dialect versions.
 *
 * @author mbechler
 */

//
// Scanning stops if the function returns an error, in which case some of
// the input may be discarded. If that error is [ErrFinalToken], scanning
// stops with no error. A non-nil token delivered with [ErrFinalToken]
// will be the last token, and a nil token with [ErrFinalToken]
// immediately stops the scanning.
//
// Otherwise, the [Scanner] advances the input. If the token is not nil,

    }

    /**
     * Constructs a signing digest with bypass option and initial sequence number
     *
     * @param macSigningKey
     *            The MAC signing key used for generating signatures
     * @param bypass
     *            Whether to bypass signature verification
     * @param initialSequence
     *            The initial sequence number for signing
     */

			di.UsedSpace = info.Used
			di.AvailableSpace = info.Free
			di.UUID = info.ID
			di.Major = info.Major
			di.Minor = info.Minor
			di.RootDisk = info.RootDisk
			di.Healing = info.Healing
			di.Scanning = info.Scanning
			di.State = diskErrToDriveState(err)
			di.FreeInodes = info.FreeInodes
			di.UsedInodes = info.UsedInodes
			if hi := disks[index].Healing(); hi != nil {
				hd := hi.toHealingDisk()

        assertFalse(result);
        verify(negotiationResponse).canReuse(null, false);
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test signing state combinations")
    void testSigningStateCombinations() {
        // Test all combinations of signing states

        // Signing disabled
        when(negotiationResponse.isSigningEnabled()).thenReturn(false);
        when(negotiationResponse.isSigningRequired()).thenReturn(false);