//   - the value of the annotation isn't parsable as int - for example because
//     it was set by a malicious user,
//   - the value of the annotation is negative or greater by int32 - for example
//     because it was set by a malicious user.
func getIndexFailureCount(logger klog.Logger, pod *v1.Pod) int32 {
	return parseIndexFailureCountAnnotation(logger, pod)
}

		switch strings.TrimSpace(p) {
		case dotdotComponent:
			return true
		case dotComponent:
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// Check if client is sending a malicious request.
func hasMultipleAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	authTypeCount := 0
	for _, hasValidAuth := range []func(*http.Request) bool{
		isRequestSignatureV2, isRequestPresignedSignatureV2,

//     TensorFlow will know to not call these on behalf of users;
//   * increased security as plugins will not be able to alter function table
//     after loading up. Thus, malicious plugins can't alter functionality to
//     probe for gadgets inside core TensorFlow. We can even protect the area
//     of memory where the copies reside to not allow any more writes to it
//     after all copies are created.

	if s.HTTP2MaxStreamsPerConnection > 0 {
		http2Options.MaxConcurrentStreams = uint32(s.HTTP2MaxStreamsPerConnection)
	} else {
		// match http2.initialMaxConcurrentStreams used by clients
		// this makes it so that a malicious client can only open 400 streams before we forcibly close the connection
		// https://github.com/golang/net/commit/b225e7ca6dde1ef5a5ae5ce922861bda011cfabd
		http2Options.MaxConcurrentStreams = 100
	}

Package multipart implements MIME multipart parsing, as defined in RFC
2046.

The implementation is sufficient for HTTP (RFC 2388) and the multipart
bodies generated by popular browsers.

# Limits

To protect against malicious inputs, this package sets limits on the size
of the MIME data it processes.

[Reader.NextPart] and [Reader.NextRawPart] limit the number of headers in a

			TotalXDSInternalErrors.Increment()
			return
		}
		// This should be only set for the first request. The node id may not be set - for example malicious clients.
		if firstRequest {
			// probe happens before envoy sends first xDS request
			if req.TypeUrl == model.HealthInfoType {

	return fmt.Sprintf("unknown key %s+%08x", e.Name, e.KeyHash)
}

// An ambiguousVerifierError indicates that the given name and hash
// match multiple keys passed to [VerifierList].
// (If this happens, some malicious actor has taken control of the
// verifier list, at which point we may as well give up entirely,
// but we diagnose the problem instead.)
type ambiguousVerifierError struct {
	name string
	hash uint32
}

As with all such files, you should ensure it's trustworthy before executing it.

Since the Wrapper JAR is usually checked into a project's version control system, there is the potential for a malicious actor to replace the original JAR with a modified one by submitting a pull request that only upgrades the Gradle version.

   *
   * <p>Note that the given byte array may be passed directly to methods on, for example, {@code
   * OutputStream} (when {@code copyTo(OutputStream)} is called on the resulting {@code
   * ByteSource}). This could allow a malicious {@code OutputStream} implementation to modify the
   * contents of the array, but provides better performance in the normal case.
   *
   * @since 15.0 (since 14.0 as {@code ByteStreams.asByteSource(byte[])}).
   */

   *
   * <p>Note that the given byte array may be passed directly to methods on, for example, {@code
   * OutputStream} (when {@code copyTo(OutputStream)} is called on the resulting {@code
   * ByteSource}). This could allow a malicious {@code OutputStream} implementation to modify the
   * contents of the array, but provides better performance in the normal case.
   *
   * @since 15.0 (since 14.0 as {@code ByteStreams.asByteSource(byte[])}).
   */