}
		}
	}
	return ""
}

// Hostnames - returns list of unique hostnames
func (l EndpointServerPools) Hostnames() []string {
	foundSet := set.NewStringSet()
	for _, ep := range l {
		for _, endpoint := range ep.Endpoints {
			if foundSet.Contains(endpoint.Hostname()) {
				continue
			}
			foundSet.Add(endpoint.Hostname())
		}
	}
	return foundSet.ToSlice()
}

     */
    public static UniAddress getByName(final String hostname) throws UnknownHostException {
        return getByName(hostname, false);
    }

    static boolean isDotQuadIP(final String hostname) {
        if (hostname != null && hostname.length() > 0 && Character.isDigit(hostname.charAt(0))) {
            int i, len, dots;
            char[] data;

            i = dots = 0; /* quick IP address validation */

  fun check(
    hostname: String,
    vararg peerCertificates: Certificate,
  ) {
    check(hostname, peerCertificates.toList())
  }

  /**
   * Returns list of matching certificates' pins for the hostname. Returns an empty list if the
   * hostname does not have pinned certificates.
   */
  fun findMatchingPins(hostname: String): List<Pin> = pins.filterList { matchesHostname(hostname) }

            assertTrue(UniAddress.isDotQuadIP(ip));
        }

        @ParameterizedTest(name = "should return false for invalid IP address or hostname: {0}")
        @ValueSource(strings = { "192.168.1", "hostname", "1.2.3.4.5", "192.168.1.1a", "a.b.c.d" })
        void shouldReturnFalseForInvalidIpAddressesOrHostnames(String input) {
            assertFalse(UniAddress.isDotQuadIP(input));
        }

 *    "www.squareup.com".
 *
 *  * **A set of hostnames.** These are in the certificate's subject alternative name (SAN)
 *    extension. A subject alternative name is either a literal hostname (`squareup.com`), a literal
 *    IP address (`74.122.190.80`), or a hostname pattern (`*.api.squareup.com`).
 *

 *  Fix: Don't crash with an `InaccessibleObjectException` when running on JDK17+ with strong
    encapsulation enabled.
 *  Fix: Strictly verify hostnames used with OkHttp's `HostnameVerifier`. Programs that make direct
    manual calls to `HostnameVerifier` could be defeated if the hostnames they pass in are not
    strictly ASCII. This issue is tracked as [CVE-2021-0341].


## Version 4.9.1

_2021-01-30_

    }

    @Test
    void testGetByName_String() throws UnknownHostException {
        // Arrange
        String hostname = "testHostname";
        Address expectedAddress = mock(Address.class);
        when(nameServiceClient.getByName(hostname)).thenReturn(expectedAddress);

        // Act
        Address actualAddress = nameServiceClient.getByName(hostname);

    private static boolean isAllDigits(final String hostname) {
        for (int i = 0; i < hostname.length(); i++) {
            if (!Character.isDigit(hostname.charAt(i))) {
                return false;
            }
        }
        return true;
    }

    @Override
    public UniAddress getByName(final String hostname) throws UnknownHostException {
        return getByName(hostname, false);
    }

    @Override

    assertThat("0:0:0:0:0:FFFF:129.144.52.38".canParseAsIpAddress()).isTrue()
    assertThat("::13.1.68.3".canParseAsIpAddress()).isTrue()
    assertThat("::FFFF:129.144.52.38".canParseAsIpAddress()).isTrue()

    // Hostnames
    assertThat("go".canParseAsIpAddress()).isFalse()
    assertThat("localhost".canParseAsIpAddress()).isFalse()
    assertThat("squareup.com".canParseAsIpAddress()).isFalse()

    Name hostName;
    int address, nodeType;
    boolean groupName, isBeingDeleted, isInConflict, isActive, isPermanent, isDataFromNodeStatus;
    byte[] macAddress;
    String calledName;

    NbtAddress(final Name hostName, final int address, final boolean groupName, final int nodeType) {
        this.hostName = hostName;
        this.address = address;