server.enqueue(
      MockResponse
        .Builder()
        .addHeader(
          "Set-Cookie: a=android; " +
            "Comment=this cookie is delicious; " +
            "Domain=${urlWithIpAddress.host}; " +
            "Max-Age=60; " +
            "Path=/path; " +
            "Secure; " +
            "Version=1",
        ).build(),
    )

      MockResponse()
        .clearHeaders()
        .addHeader("Cookie: s=square")
        .addHeader("Cookie: a=android")
        .addHeader("Cookies: delicious")
    response.setHeader("cookie", "r=robot")
    assertThat(headersToList(response))
      .containsExactly("Cookies: delicious", "cookie: r=robot")
  }

  @Test
  fun mockResponseSetHeaders() {
    val response =
      MockResponse()
        .clearHeaders()

        .Builder()
        .clearHeaders()
        .addHeader("Cookie: s=square")
        .addHeader("Cookie: a=android")
        .addHeader("Cookies: delicious")
    builder.setHeader("cookie", "r=robot")
    assertThat(headersToList(builder)).containsExactly("Cookies: delicious", "cookie: r=robot")
  }

  @Test
  fun mockResponseSetHeaders() {
    val builder =
      MockResponse
        .Builder()

        assertEquals(0, response3.getTotal());

        SuggestResponse response4 = suggester.suggest().setQuery("delicious").setSuggestDetail(true).execute().getResponse();
        assertEquals(1, response4.getNum());
        assertEquals(1, response4.getTotal());
        assertEquals("delicious", response4.getWords().get(0));
    }

    @Test
    @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")

        }
    }

    public void test_install_pathTraversalPrevention() throws IOException {
        // Create a zip with potentially dangerous paths
        Path jarPath = tempDir.resolve("malicious.jar");
        createMockThemeZipWithDangerousPaths(jarPath);

        ThemeHelper mockThemeHelper = new ThemeHelper() {
            @Override
            protected Path getJarFile(Artifact artifact) {

			return true
		case segmentEnd-segmentStart == 1 && path[segmentStart] == '.':
			return true
		}
		i++
	}
	return false
}

// Check if client is sending a malicious request.
func hasMultipleAuth(r *http.Request) bool {
	authTypeCount := 0
	for _, hasValidAuth := range []func(*http.Request) bool{
		isRequestSignatureV2, isRequestPresignedSignatureV2,

    public void test_getPyFilePath_withDirectoryTraversal() {
        pythonJob.filename("../../malicious.py");

        String expectedPath = "WEB-INF" + File.separator + "env" + File.separator + "python" + File.separator + "resources" + File.separator
                + "//malicious.py";
        assertEquals(expectedPath, pythonJob.getPyFilePath());
    }

   *
   * <p>Note that the given byte array may be passed directly to methods on, for example, {@code
   * OutputStream} (when {@code copyTo(OutputStream)} is called on the resulting {@code
   * ByteSource}). This could allow a malicious {@code OutputStream} implementation to modify the
   * contents of the array, but provides better performance in the normal case.
   *
   * @since 15.0 (since 14.0 as {@code ByteStreams.asByteSource(byte[])}).
   */

 * randomly ordered data (the probability decreases faster than exponentially in N), but if you are
 * passing in unsanitized user data then a malicious user could force it. A light shuffle of the
 * data using an unpredictable seed should normally be enough to thwart this attack.
 *
 * <p>The time taken to compute multiple quantiles on the same dataset using {@link Scale#indexes

		}
	}

	// Assume that uncompressed size 2³²-1 could plausibly happen in
	// an old zip32 file that was sharding inputs into the largest chunks
	// possible (or is just malicious; search the web for 42.zip).
	// If needUSize is true still, it means we didn't see a zip64 extension.
	// As long as the compressed size is not also 2³²-1 (implausible)
	// and the header is not also 2³²-1 (equally implausible),