//   - Expression accessing a property named "x-prop": {"Expression": "object.x__dash__prop > 0"}
  //   - Expression accessing a property named "redact__d": {"Expression": "object.redact__underscores__d > 0"}
  //
  // Equality on arrays with list type of 'set' or 'map' ignores element order, i.e. [1, 2] == [2, 1].

      (if (isCanceled()) "canceled " else "") +
        (if (forWebSocket) "web socket" else "call") +
        " to " + redactedUrl()
    )
  }

  internal fun redactedUrl(): String = originalRequest.url.redact()

  inner class AsyncCall(
    private val responseCallback: Callback,
  ) : Runnable {
    @Volatile var callsPerHost = AtomicInteger(0)
      private set

    requests with the same POST data get the same cache entry.

 *  New: `HttpLoggingInterceptor.redactQueryParams()` configures the query parameters to redact
    in logs. For best security, don't put sensitive information in query parameters.

 *  New: `ConnectionPool.setPolicy()` configures a minimum connection pool size for a target

    val queryParameterValue: String? = httpUrl.queryParameterValue(0)
    val encodedFragment: String? = httpUrl.encodedFragment
    val fragment: String? = httpUrl.fragment
    val redact: String = httpUrl.redact()
    var builder: HttpUrl.Builder = httpUrl.newBuilder()
    var resolveBuilder: HttpUrl.Builder? = httpUrl.newBuilder("")
    val topPrivateDomain: String? = httpUrl.topPrivateDomain()

              close(1010, "unexpected Sec-WebSocket-Extensions in response header")
            }
          }

          // Process all web socket messages.
          val name = "$okHttpName WebSocket ${request.url.redact()}"
          initReaderAndWriter(name, streams)
          loopReader(response)
        }

        override fun onFailure(
          call: Call,
          e: IOException,
        ) {

			vs = ValueSourceDef
		}

		if redactSecrets && isRedacted {
			// Skip adding redacted secrets to the output.
			continue
		}

		r = append(r, KVSrc{
			Key:   kv.Key,
			Value: v,
			Src:   vs,
		})
	}

	// Add the comment key as well if non-empty (and comments are never
	// redacted).
	v, vs, _ := c.ResolveConfigParam(subSys, target, Comment, redactSecrets)

	for i := 0; i < len(all); i++ {
		for j := 0; j < len(all)-i; j++ {
			buf := make([]byte, j)
			n, err := b.ReadAt(buf, int64(i))
			if err != nil || n != len(buf) {
				t.Errorf("ReadAt(%d, %d) = %d, %v; want %d, nil", i, j, n, err, len(buf))
			}
			if !bytes.Equal(buf, all[i:i+j]) {
				t.Errorf("ReadAt(%d, %d) = %q; want %q", i, j, buf, all[i:i+j])
			}
		}
	}
}

  // There are a maximum of 64 match conditions allowed.
  //
  // The exact matching logic is (in order):
  //   1. If ANY matchCondition evaluates to FALSE, the webhook is skipped.
  //   2. If ALL matchConditions evaluate to TRUE, the webhook is called.
  //   3. If any matchCondition evaluates to an error (but none are FALSE):
  //      - If failurePolicy=Fail, reject the request

			// Verify if date headers are set, if not reject the request
			amzDate, errCode := parseAmzDateHeader(r)
			if errCode != ErrNone {
				if ok {
					tc.FuncName = "handler.Auth"
					tc.ResponseRecorder.LogErrBody = true
				}

				// All our internal APIs are sensitive towards Date
				// header, for all requests where Date header is not
				// present we will reject such clients.

  // There are a maximum of 64 match conditions allowed.
  //
  // The exact matching logic is (in order):
  //   1. If ANY matchCondition evaluates to FALSE, the webhook is skipped.
  //   2. If ALL matchConditions evaluate to TRUE, the webhook is called.
  //   3. If any matchCondition evaluates to an error (but none are FALSE):
  //      - If failurePolicy=Fail, reject the request