rst.fail("decimal number overflow")
		}
		val *= 10
		val += add
		rst.advance(1)
	}
	return val
}

// oldRustToString demangles a Rust symbol using the old demangling.
// The second result reports whether this is a valid Rust mangled name.
func oldRustToString(name string, options []Option) (string, bool) {
	max := 0
	for _, o := range options {
		if isMaxLength(o) {
			max = maxLength(o)

	if *trustCert != "" {
		pool := x509.NewCertPool()
		certFile, err := os.ReadFile(*trustCert)
		if err != nil {
			log.Fatalf("load trust-cert err: %s", err)
		}
		block, _ := pem.Decode(certFile)
		cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
		if err != nil {
			log.Fatalf("parse trust-cert err: %s", err)
		}
		pool.AddCert(cert)
		cfg.RootCAs = pool
	}

	if *requireAnyClientCertificate {

        return newRoot;
    }

    private SnapshotHierarchy removeUnwatchedSnapshots(SnapshotHierarchy newRoot, Invalidator invalidator) {
        // Keep only snapshots we can trust
        return retainOnlyMatchingSnapshots(newRoot, invalidator, snapshot -> {
            // Keep everything in immutable locations, because Gradle makes sure
            // to update the VFS when it updates those locations

			t.Errorf("error check failed: %s", err)
			t.Log("vet stderr:\n", cmd.Stderr)
		}
	})
}

func cgoEnabled(t *testing.T) bool {
	// Don't trust build.Default.CgoEnabled as it is false for
	// cross-builds unless CGO_ENABLED is explicitly specified.
	// That's fine for the builders, but causes commands like
	// 'GOARCH=386 go test .' to fail.

				knn, k := findKNN(limit)
				if knn == nil || k < 0 {
					return false
				}
				// limit == (something nonnegative) - k. That subtraction can't underflow, so
				// we can trust it.
				if inclusive {
					// ind <= knn - k cannot overflow if step is at most k
					return step <= k
				}
				// ind < knn - k cannot overflow if step is at most k+1

		}

		// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
		// the client that it may send any certificate in response
		// to our request. When we know the CAs we trust, then
		// we can send them down, so that the client can choose
		// an appropriate certificate to give to us.
		if c.config.ClientCAs != nil {
			certReq.certificateAuthorities = c.config.ClientCAs.Subjects()
		}

}

// Go 1.2 symbol table format.
// See golang.org/s/go12symtab.
//
// A general note about the methods here: rather than try to avoid
// index out of bounds errors, we trust Go to detect them, and then
// we recover from the panics and treat them as indicative of a malformed
// or incomplete table.
//
// The methods called by symtab.go, which begin with "go12" prefixes,

umbrellas in a general infection of ill temper, and losing their foot-hold at street-corners, where tens of thousands of other foot passengers have been slipping and sliding since the day broke (if this day ever broke), adding new deposits to the crust upon crust of mud, sticking at those points tenaciously to the pavement, and accumulating at compound interest.  	Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits and meadows; fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of...

	// DNSName, if set, is checked against the leaf certificate with
	// Certificate.VerifyHostname or the platform verifier.
	DNSName string

	// Intermediates is an optional pool of certificates that are not trust
	// anchors, but can be used to form a chain from the leaf certificate to a
	// root certificate.
	Intermediates *CertPool
	// Roots is the set of trusted root certificates the leaf certificate needs

			return err
		}
	} else {
		// This is a renegotiation handshake. We require that the
		// server's identity (i.e. leaf certificate) is unchanged and
		// thus any previous trust decision is still valid.
		//
		// See https://mitls.org/pages/attacks/3SHAKE for the
		// motivation behind this requirement.
		if !bytes.Equal(c.peerCertificates[0].Raw, certMsg.certificates[0]) {