TensorFlower Gardener <******@****.***> 1695063637 -0700

EOF
  exit 1
fi
TFCI_BAZEL_COMMON_ARGS="$TFCI_BAZEL_COMMON_ARGS --config rbe_$TFCI_BAZEL_TARGET_SELECTING_CONFIG_PREFIX"

# These flags share the user's gcloud credentials with the container, so that bazel
# inside the container can authenticate. Note: TF's CI does not have any credential
# stored here.

-   type: textarea id: logs attributes: label: Relevant log output description:
    Please copy and paste any relevant log output. This will be automatically

    licenses = ["notice"],
)

# Currently pybind extension shared objects must use only C API headers since
# the C API has static initializers duplicated in the Python bindings. So we
# need a second rule that omits .cc files, in
# tensorflow/python:_pywrap_parallel_device.
filegroup(
    name = "lib_headers",
    srcs = ["parallel_device_lib.h"],
)

filegroup(
    name = "lib_sources",

#   public URL to share your build results with collaborators. However,
#   it is only available to a limited set of internal TensorFlow developers.
#
#   RBE is incompatible with local caching, so you must remove
#   disk_cache, public_cache, and public_cache_push from your $TFCI file.
#
# To use RBE, you must first run `gcloud auth application-default login`, then:
export TFCI=py311,linux_x86,rbe

COPY builder.devtoolset/gcc9-fixups.patch /gcc9-fixups.patch
COPY builder.devtoolset/stringop_trunc.patch /stringop_trunc.patch

RUN /build_devtoolset.sh devtoolset-10 /dt10

# Build later version of patchelf that is not so buggy
COPY builder.patchelf/build_patchelf.sh /build_patchelf.sh
COPY apt.conf /etc/apt/
RUN /build_patchelf.sh

################################################################################

users are aware of the security risks detailed here and that they are going to
be practically running code provided by other users. Currently there are no good
ways to detect malicious models/graphs/checkpoints, so the recommended way to
mitigate the risk in this scenario is to sandbox the model execution.

### Hardware attacks

Physical GPUs or TPUs can also be the target of attacks. [Published

    default_visibility = ["//visibility:private"],
    licenses = ["notice"],
)

# Filesystem implementation for POSIX environments: Linux, MacOS, Android, etc.
tf_cc_shared_object(
    name = "libposix_filesystem.so",
    framework_so = [],
    linkstatic = False,
    visibility = ["//visibility:public"],
    deps = [":posix_filesystem_impl"],
)

# The real implementation of the filesystem.
cc_library(

    echo "# Size of $TF_WHEEL is $WHEEL_MEGABYTES / $LARGEST_OK_SIZE megabytes." >&3
    test "$WHEEL_MEGABYTES" -le "$LARGEST_OK_SIZE"
}

# Note: this runs before the tests further down the file, so TF is installed in
# the venv and the venv is active when those tests run. The venv gets cleaned
# up in teardown_file() above.
@test "Wheel is installable" {
    python3 -m venv /tf/venv
    source /tf/venv/bin/activate

    # copybara:uncomment default_applicable_licenses = ["//tensorflow:license"],
    licenses = ["notice"],
)

# Filesystem implementation for GCS environments
tf_cc_shared_object(
    name = "gcs_filesystem",
    framework_so = [],
    linkstatic = False,
    per_os_targets = 1,
    visibility = ["//visibility:public"],
    deps = [":gcs_filesystem_impl"],
)

# The real implementation of the filesystem.
cc_library(