}
	}

	// Deleting fileInfos[4].VersionID, fileInfos[5].VersionID should return empty data dir; there are other object version sharing the data dir.
	// Subsequently deleting fileInfos[6].versionID should return fileInfos[6].dataDir since there are no other object versions sharing this data dir.
	count := len(testCases)
	for i := 4; i < len(testCases); i++ {
		tc := testCases[i]

		u, err := sys.OpenIDConfig.LookupUser(roleArn, puInfo.subClaimValue)
		if err != nil {
			iamLogIf(GlobalContext, err)
			continue
		}
		// If user is set to "disabled", we will remove them
		// subsequently.
		if !u.Enabled {
			expiredUsers = append(expiredUsers, parentUser)
		}
	}

	// We ignore any errors
	_ = sys.store.DeleteUsers(ctx, expiredUsers)
}

		// is ready to be read.
		//
		// This is possible to be lock free because
		// - xl.meta for inlined objects has already read the data
		//   into memory, any mutation on xl.meta subsequently is
		//   inconsequential to the overall read operation.
		// - xl.meta metadata is still verified for quorum under lock()
		//   however writing the response doesn't need to serialize
		//   concurrent writers

					newDisks := getQuorumDisks(disks, infos, (len(disks)+1)/2)
					if newDisks != nil {
						// If we found disks signature in quorum, we proceed to list
						// from a single drive, shuffling of the drives is subsequently.
						disks = newDisks
						askDisks = 1
					} else {
						// If we did not find suitable disks, perform strict quorum listing
						// as no disk agrees on quorum anymore.

vulnerability exists in the NodeRestriction admission controller where node users can delete their corresponding node object by patching themselves with an OwnerReference to a cluster-scoped resource. If the OwnerReference resource does not exist or is subsequently deleted, the given node object will be deleted via garbage collection. By default, node users are authorized for create and patch requests but not delete requests against their node object. Since the NodeRestriction admission controller does not...

			c.RLock()
			enabled := c.enabled
			c.RUnlock()
			if enabled {
				refreshStart := time.Now()
				c.healIAMSystem(ctx, objAPI) // heal IAM system first
				c.healBuckets(ctx, objAPI)   // heal buckets subsequently

				took := time.Since(refreshStart).Seconds()
				if took > maxRefreshDurationSecondsForLog {
					// Log if we took a lot of time.
					logger.Info("Site replication healing refresh took %.2fs", took)

        assertEquals(A, projectBuilds.iterator().next());

        final List<MavenProject> subsequent = graph.markAsFinished(A);
        assertEquals(2, subsequent.size());
        assertEquals(ProjectDependencyGraphStub.B, subsequent.get(0));
        assertEquals(C, subsequent.get(1));

        final List<MavenProject> bDescendants = graph.markAsFinished(B);
        assertEquals(1, bDescendants.size());

        } finally {
            FileUtil.deleteInBackground(tempFile);
        }
    }

    /**
     * Marks the current position in this input stream. A subsequent call to the reset method repositions this stream at the last marked position so that subsequent reads re-read the same bytes.
     * This method delegates to {@link FileInputStream#mark(int)}.
     *

// unless that metadata is needed in order to allow a subsequent data retrieval
// to  be  correctly  handled.   For example, changes to st_atime or st_mtime
// (respectively, time of last access and time of last modification; see inode(7))
// do not require flushing because they are not necessary for a subsequent data
// read to be handled correctly. On the other hand, a change to the file size

  }

  /**
   * Returns a supplier which caches the instance retrieved during the first call to {@code get()}
   * and returns that value on subsequent calls to {@code get()}. See: <a
   * href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memoization">memoization</a>
   *
   * <p>The returned supplier is thread-safe. The delegate's {@code get()} method will be invoked at