```Python hl_lines="30-31" title="app/routers/items.py"
{!../../docs_src/bigger_applications/app/routers/items.py!}
```

/// tip | "Dica"

Esta última operação de caminho terá a combinação de tags: `["items", "custom"]`.

E também terá ambas as respostas na documentação, uma para `404` e uma para `403`.

///

## O principal `FastAPI`

Agora, vamos ver o módulo em `app/main.py`.

          <description>
            The configurator type to use when injecting parameter values into this Mojo. The value is normally deduced
            from the Mojo's implementation language, but can be specified to allow a custom ComponentConfigurator
            implementation to be used.
          </description>
        </field>
        <field>
          <name>composer</name>
          <version>1.0.0/1.1.0</version>

```Python hl_lines="30-31" title="app/routers/items.py"
{!../../docs_src/bigger_applications/app/routers/items.py!}
```

/// tip | "Tipp"

Diese letzte Pfadoperation wird eine Kombination von Tags haben: `["items", "custom"]`.

Und sie wird auch beide Responses in der Dokumentation haben, eine für `404` und eine für `403`.

///

## Das Haupt-`FastAPI`.

Sehen wir uns nun das Modul unter `app/main.py` an.

	*at = SecretType(in)
	return nil
}

const (
	// Use a bearer token for authentication to the remote kubernetes cluster.
	RemoteSecretAuthTypeBearerToken RemoteSecretAuthType = "bearer-token"

	// Use a custom authentication plugin for the remote kubernetes cluster.
	RemoteSecretAuthTypePlugin RemoteSecretAuthType = "plugin"

	// Secret generated from remote cluster
	SecretTypeRemote SecretType = "remote"

public class CycleDetectingLockFactory {

  /**
   * Encapsulates the action to be taken when a potential deadlock is encountered. Clients can use
   * one of the predefined {@link Policies} or specify a custom implementation. Implementations must
   * be thread-safe.
   *
   * @since 13.0
   */
  public interface Policy {

    /**

This release contains changes that address the following vulnerabilities:

### CVE-2022-3162: Unauthorized read of Custom Resources

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group they are not authorized to read.

**Affected Versions**:

- API paging is now enabled for custom resource definitions, custom resources and APIService objects. ([#67861](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/67861), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))

and specified for [deprecated versions of custom resources](https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/extend-kubernetes/custom-resources/custom-resource-definition-versioning/#version-deprecation).

### Avoiding permanent beta

        </field>
        <!--
        This could be included once we teach Maven to deal with multiple versions of the model
        <field>
          <name>custom</name>
          <version>4.1.0+</version>
          <description>Describes a custom profile activation trigger, brought in via build
            extension.</description>
          <association>
            <type>ActivationCustom</type>

- Fixes an issue that can result in namespaced custom resources being orphaned when their namespace is deleted, if the CRD defining the custom resource is removed concurrently with namespaces being deleted, then recreated. ([#93790](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/93790), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt)) [SIG API Machinery...