/**
     * Extended attributes are supported flag.
     */
    int FLAGS2_EXTENDED_ATTRIBUTES = 0x0002;
    /**
     * Security signatures are supported flag.
     */
    int FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURES = 0x0004;
    /**
     * Security signatures are required flag.
     */
    int FLAGS2_SECURITY_REQUIRE_SIGNATURES = 0x0010;
    /**
     * Extended security negotiation is supported flag.
     */

    @BeforeEach
    void setUp() {
        testCache = new TestBufferCacheImpl(5, 1024); // 5 buffers of 1KB each
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("BufferCache interface should define correct method signatures")
    void testInterfaceContract() {
        // Given
        BufferCache cache = mockBufferCache;

        // When & Then - verify interface methods exist and can be called
        assertDoesNotThrow(() -> {

    int FLAGS2_NONE = 0x0000;
    /** Long filenames supported flag */
    int FLAGS2_LONG_FILENAMES = 0x0001;
    /** Extended attributes supported flag */
    int FLAGS2_EXTENDED_ATTRIBUTES = 0x0002;
    /** Security signatures supported flag */
    int FLAGS2_SECURITY_SIGNATURES = 0x0004;
    /** Extended security negotiation flag */
    int FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY_NEGOTIATION = 0x0800;
    /** Resolve paths in DFS flag */

        }

        @Test
        @DisplayName("Should correctly verify signatures - regression test for inverted logic bug")
        void testVerifySignatureLogicRegression() throws Exception {
            // This test ensures the signature verification logic is not inverted
            // Previously there was a bug where verify returned true for invalid signatures

            // Set signed flag

     */
    @Override
    public boolean verifySignature(final byte[] buffer, final int i, final int size) {
        // observed too that signatures on error responses are sometimes wrong??
        // Looks like the failure case also is just reflecting back the signature we sent

        // with SMB3's negotiation validation it's no longer possible to ignore this (on the validation response)

      androidSignature(rootProject.libs.signature.android.apilevel24) { artifact { type = "signature" } }
    } else {
      // Everything else requires Android API 21+.
      androidSignature(rootProject.libs.signature.android.apilevel21) { artifact { type = "signature" } }
    }

    // OkHttp requires Java 8+.
    jvmSignature(rootProject.libs.codehaus.signature.java18) { artifact { type = "signature" } }
  }

    .heldCertificate(serverCertificate, intermediateCertificate.certificate())
    .build();
```

The client only needs to know the trusted root certificate. It checks the server's certificate by
validating the signatures within the chain.

```java
HandshakeCertificates clientCertificates = new HandshakeCertificates.Builder()
    .addTrustedCertificate(rootCertificate.certificate())
    .build();

          /*
           * When we block access to AtomicReferenceFieldUpdater, we can't even reflect on
           * AbstractFuture, since it declares methods that use that type in their signatures.
           */
          && !method.getName().equals("testFutures_nullChecks")) {
        suite.addTest(
            TestSuite.createTest(

          issuerUniqueID = null,
          subjectUniqueID = null,
          extensions = extensions(),
        )

      // Signature.
      val signature =
        Signature.getInstance(tbsCertificate.signatureAlgorithmName).run {
          initSign(issuerKeyPair.private)
          update(CertificateAdapters.tbsCertificate.toDer(tbsCertificate).toByteArray())
          sign().toByteString()

        assertTrue(result); // Signature mismatch expected
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test verify method with invalid signature")
    void testVerifyWithInvalidSignature() {
        SMB1SigningDigest digest = new SMB1SigningDigest(testMacSigningKey);
        byte[] data = new byte[100];

        // Set invalid signature
        for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {