expiryTime := svc.Expiration
		serviceAccountList = append(serviceAccountList, madmin.ServiceAccountInfo{
			AccessKey:  svc.AccessKey,
			Expiration: &expiryTime,
		})
	}
	for _, sts := range stsKeys {
		expiryTime := sts.Expiration
		stsKeyList = append(stsKeyList, madmin.ServiceAccountInfo{
			AccessKey:  sts.AccessKey,
			Expiration: &expiryTime,
		})
	}

	listResp := madmin.ListAccessKeysLDAPResp{

	if len(credElements) < 5 {
		return ch, ErrCredMalformed
	}
	accessKey := strings.Join(credElements[:len(credElements)-4], SlashSeparator) // The access key may contain one or more `/`
	if !auth.IsAccessKeyValid(accessKey) {
		return ch, ErrInvalidAccessKeyID
	}
	// Save access key id.
	cred := credentialHeader{
		accessKey: accessKey,
	}
	credElements = credElements[len(credElements)-4:]
	var e error

	// policy is inherited from `user.AccessKey`.
	cred.ParentUser = user.AccessKey

	// Set the newly generated credentials.
	updatedAt, err := globalIAMSys.SetTempUser(ctx, cred.AccessKey, cred, "")
	if err != nil {
		writeSTSErrorResponse(ctx, w, ErrSTSInternalError, err)
		return
	}

	// Call hook for site replication.
	if cred.ParentUser != globalActiveCred.AccessKey {

			return BucketRemoteTargetNotFound{Bucket: tgt.TargetBucket, Err: err}
		case "AccessDenied":
			return RemoteTargetConnectionErr{Bucket: tgt.TargetBucket, AccessKey: tgt.Credentials.AccessKey, Err: err}
		}
		return RemoteTargetConnectionErr{Bucket: tgt.TargetBucket, AccessKey: tgt.Credentials.AccessKey, Err: err}
	}
	if !exists {
		return BucketRemoteTargetNotFound{Bucket: tgt.TargetBucket}
	}
	if tgt.Type == madmin.ReplicationService {

		return nil, errors.New("both the token file and the role ARN are required")
	case conf.AccessKey == "" && conf.SecretKey != "" || conf.AccessKey != "" && conf.SecretKey == "":
		return nil, errors.New("both the access and secret keys are required")
	case conf.AWSRole && (conf.AWSRoleWebIdentityTokenFile != "" || conf.AWSRoleARN != "" || conf.AccessKey != "" || conf.SecretKey != ""):

	}

	r.Form.Del(xhttp.Expires)

	return ErrNone
}

func getReqAccessKeyV2(r *http.Request) (auth.Credentials, bool, APIErrorCode) {
	if accessKey := r.Form.Get(xhttp.AmzAccessKeyID); accessKey != "" {
		return checkKeyValid(r, accessKey)
	}

	// below is V2 Signed Auth header format, splitting on `space` (after the `AWS` string).
	// Authorization = "AWS" + " " + AWSAccessKeyId + ":" + Signature

	// remove the root user. Also you cannot delete yourself.
	if accessKey == globalActiveCred.AccessKey || accessKey == cred.AccessKey {
		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, errIAMActionNotAllowed), r.URL)
		return
	}

	if err := globalIAMSys.DeleteUser(ctx, accessKey, true); err != nil {
		writeErrorResponseJSON(ctx, w, toAdminAPIErr(ctx, err), r.URL)
		return
	}

			accessKey:            credentials.AccessKey,
			secretKey:            credentials.SecretKey,
			expectedBucketPolicy: bucketPolicyTemplate,
			expectedRespStatus:   http.StatusNotFound,
		},
		// Test case - 3.
		// Case with non-existent bucket name.
		{
			bucketName:           ".invalid-bucket-name",
			accessKey:            credentials.AccessKey,

func validateCredentialfields(t *testing.T, testNum int, expectedCredentials credentialHeader, actualCredential credentialHeader) {
	if expectedCredentials.accessKey != actualCredential.accessKey {
		t.Errorf("Test %d: AccessKey mismatch: Expected \"%s\", got \"%s\"", testNum, expectedCredentials.accessKey, actualCredential.accessKey)
	}
	if !expectedCredentials.scope.date.Equal(actualCredential.scope.date) {

	}
	secret := globalActiveCred.SecretKey
	if globalSiteReplicationSys.isEnabled() && cred.AccessKey != siteReplicatorSvcAcc {
		nsecret, err := getTokenSigningKey()
		if err != nil {
			return nil, toAPIErrorCode(r.Context(), err)
		}
		// sign root's temporary accounts also with site replicator creds
		if cred.ParentUser != globalActiveCred.AccessKey || cred.IsTemp() {
			secret = nsecret
		}
	}
	if cred.IsServiceAccount() {