"email": "******@****.***",
        "hashed_password": "$2b$12$EixZaYVK1fsbw1ZfbX3OXePaWxn96p36WQoeG6Lruj3vjPGga31lW",
        "disabled": False,
    },
    "alice": {
        "username": "alice",
        "full_name": "Alice Chains",
        "email": "******@****.***",
        "hashed_password": "$2b$12$gSvqqUPvlXP2tfVFaWK1Be7DlH.PKZbv5H8KnzzVgXXbVxpva.pFm",
        "disabled": True,
    },
}

 * <tt>S-1-5-21-1496946806-2192648263-3843101252-1029</tt> but they may
 * also be resolved to yield the name of the associated Windows account
 * such as <tt>Administrators</tt> or <tt>MYDOM\alice</tt>.
 * <p>
 * Consider the following output of <tt>examples/SidLookup.java</tt>:
 * 
 * <pre>
 *        toString: S-1-5-21-4133388617-793952518-2001621813-512
 * toDisplayString: WNET\Domain Admins

 * the then same process is repeated for inherited ACEs.
 * <p>
 * For example, if user <tt>WNET\alice</tt> tries to open a file
 * with desired access bits <tt>0x00000003</tt> (<tt>FILE_READ_DATA |
 * FILE_WRITE_DATA</tt>) and the target file has the following security
 * descriptor ACEs:
 * 
 * <pre>
 * Allow WNET\alice     0x001200A9  Direct
 * Allow Administrators 0x001F01FF  Inherited
 * Allow SYSTEM         0x001F01FF  Inherited

{"version":3,"sources":["jquery-3.7.1.js"],"names":["global","factory","module","exports","document","w","Error","window","this","noGlobal","arr","getProto","Object","getPrototypeOf","slice","flat","array","call","concat","apply","push","indexOf","class2type","toString","hasOwn","hasOwnProperty","fnToString","ObjectFunctionString","support","isFunction","obj","nodeType","item","isWindow","preservedScriptAttributes","type","src","nonce","noModule","DOMEval","code","node","doc","i","val","scrip...

 * the then same process is repeated for inherited ACEs.
 * <p>
 * For example, if user <tt>WNET\alice</tt> tries to open a file
 * with desired access bits <tt>0x00000003</tt> (<tt>FILE_READ_DATA |
 * FILE_WRITE_DATA</tt>) and the target file has the following security
 * descriptor ACEs:
 * 
 * <pre>
 * Allow WNET\alice     0x001200A9  Direct
 * Allow Administrators 0x001F01FF  Inherited
 * Allow SYSTEM         0x001F01FF  Inherited

        "email": "******@****.***",
        "hashed_password": "$2b$12$EixZaYVK1fsbw1ZfbX3OXePaWxn96p36WQoeG6Lruj3vjPGga31lW",
        "disabled": False,
    },
    "alice": {
        "username": "alice",
        "full_name": "Alice Chains",
        "email": "******@****.***",
        "hashed_password": "$2b$12$gSvqqUPvlXP2tfVFaWK1Be7DlH.PKZbv5H8KnzzVgXXbVxpva.pFm",
        "disabled": True,
    },
}

        "email": "******@****.***",
        "hashed_password": "$2b$12$EixZaYVK1fsbw1ZfbX3OXePaWxn96p36WQoeG6Lruj3vjPGga31lW",
        "disabled": False,
    },
    "alice": {
        "username": "alice",
        "full_name": "Alice Chains",
        "email": "******@****.***",
        "hashed_password": "$2b$12$gSvqqUPvlXP2tfVFaWK1Be7DlH.PKZbv5H8KnzzVgXXbVxpva.pFm",
        "disabled": True,
    },
}

 * the then same process is repeated for inherited ACEs.
 * <p>
 * For example, if user <tt>WNET\alice</tt> tries to open a file
 * with desired access bits <tt>0x00000003</tt> (<tt>FILE_READ_DATA |
 * FILE_WRITE_DATA</tt>) and the target file has the following security
 * descriptor ACEs:
 * <pre>
 * Allow WNET\alice     0x001200A9  Direct
 * Allow Administrators 0x001F01FF  Inherited
 * Allow SYSTEM         0x001F01FF  Inherited

- Fixed a bug in the JSON frame reader that could cause it to retain a reference to the underlying array of the byte slice passed to read. ([#123620](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/123620), [@benluddy](https://github.com/benluddy))

 * kubeadm: The Token-related fields in the `MasterConfiguration` object have now been refactored. Instead of the top-level `.Token`, `.TokenTTL`, `.TokenUsages`, `.TokenGroups` fields, there is now a `BootstrapTokens` slice of `BootstrapToken` objects that support the same features under the `.Token`, `.TTL`, `.Usages`, `.Groups` fields. ([#64408](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/64408), [@luxas](https://github.com/luxas))