CONTRIBUTORS SHALL HAVE ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
LOST PROFITS), HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY
WAY OUT OF THE USE OR DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROGRAM OR THE EXERCISE OF ANY RIGHTS
GRANTED HEREUNDER, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

 *  Fix: Acknowledge and apply inbound HTTP/2 settings atomically. Previously we had a race where we
    could use new flow control capacity before acknowledging it, causing strict HTTP/2 servers to
    fail the call.

 *  Fix: Recover gracefully when a coalesced connection immediately goes unhealthy.

## Version 3.14.2

_2019-05-19_

     * resources, however comes at the cost of having to properly release all SmbFile instances you no longer need.
     * 
     * @return whether to use strict resource lifecycle
     */
    boolean isStrictResourceLifecycle ();


    /**
     * This is solely intended for debugging
     * 

This is fairly straightforward.

First, we need to check that this traffic is allowed.
Traffic may be denied by RBAC policies (especially from a `STRICT` mode enforcement, which denies plaintext traffic).

If it is allowed, we will forward to the target destination.

#### Hairpin

    if (DASH_MATCHER.matches(part.charAt(0))
        || DASH_MATCHER.matches(part.charAt(part.length() - 1))) {
      return false;
    }

    /*
     * Note that we allow (in contravention of a strict interpretation of the relevant RFCs) domain
     * parts other than the last may begin with a digit (for example, "3com.com"). It's important to

		header.Set("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block")                                // Prevents against XSS attacks
		header.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")                                // Prevent mime-sniff
		header.Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains") // HSTS mitigates variants of MITM attacks

		// Previously, this value was set right before a response was sent to

	tokenWaitBackoff = time.Second
)

func init() {
	scheme = runtime.NewScheme()
	utilruntime.Must(v1.AddToScheme(scheme))
	opt := json.SerializerOptions{
		Yaml:   true,
		Pretty: false,
		Strict: false,
	}
	yamlSerializer := json.NewSerializerWithOptions(json.DefaultMetaFactory, scheme, scheme, opt)
	codec = versioning.NewDefaultingCodecForScheme(
		scheme,
		yamlSerializer,
		yamlSerializer,

 *      * response ([responseFailed])
 *        * headers ([responseHeadersStart], [responseHeadersEnd])
 *        * body ([responseBodyStart], [responseBodyEnd])
 *
 * This nesting is typical but not strict. For example, when calls use "Expect: continue" the
 * request body start and end events occur within the response header events. Similarly,
 * [duplex calls][RequestBody.isDuplex] interleave the request and response bodies.
 *

      Header("range", ""),
      Header("referer", ""),
      Header("refresh", ""),
      Header("retry-after", ""),
      Header("server", ""),
      Header("set-cookie", ""),
      Header("strict-transport-security", ""),
      Header("transfer-encoding", ""),
      Header("user-agent", ""),
      Header("vary", ""),
      Header("via", ""),
      Header("www-authenticate", ""),
    )

 *
 * This cache limits the number of bytes that it will store on the filesystem. When the number of
 * stored bytes exceeds the limit, the cache will remove entries in the background until the limit
 * is satisfied. The limit is not strict: the cache may temporarily exceed it while waiting for
 * files to be deleted. The limit does not include filesystem overhead or the cache journal so
 * space-sensitive applications should set a conservative limit.
 *