* {@code enterXxx}, {@code tryEnterXxx}, and {@code waitForXxx} method of the {@code Monitor} class
 * is analyzed reflectively to determine appropriate test cases based on its signature. Additional
 * ad hoc test cases can be found in {@link SupplementalMonitorTest}.
 *
 * @author Justin T. Sampson
 */
public class GeneratedMonitorTest extends TestCase {

  public static TestSuite suite() {

		HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
	},
	ErrMissingSignTag: {
		Code:           "AccessDenied",
		Description:    "Signature header missing Signature field.",
		HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
	},
	ErrMissingSignHeadersTag: {
		Code:           "InvalidArgument",
		Description:    "Signature header missing SignedHeaders field.",
		HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
	},
	ErrMalformedExpires: {

  // valid for.
  // See:
  // 	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3
  // 	https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.12
  //
  // Valid values are:
  //  "signing",
  //  "digital signature",
  //  "content commitment",
  //  "key encipherment",
  //  "key agreement",
  //  "data encipherment",
  //  "cert sign",
  //  "crl sign",
  //  "encipher only",
  //  "decipher only",

    while (!descendant.equals(ancestor)) {
      classes.add(descendant);
      descendant = descendant.getSuperclass();
    }

    return classes;
  }

  /**
   * Not really a signature -- just the parts that affect whether one method is a fauxveride of a
   * method from an ancestor class.
   *
   * <p>See JLS 8.4.2 for the definition of the related "override-equivalent."
   */

    while (!descendant.equals(ancestor)) {
      classes.add(descendant);
      descendant = descendant.getSuperclass();
    }

    return classes;
  }

  /**
   * Not really a signature -- just the parts that affect whether one method is a fauxveride of a
   * method from an ancestor class.
   *
   * <p>See JLS 8.4.2 for the definition of the related "override-equivalent."
   */

            throw new CIFSException("Signing is not initialized");
        }

        int ver = SMBUtil.readInt4(mic, 0);
        if ( ver != 1 ) {
            throw new SmbUnsupportedOperationException("Invalid signature version");
        }

        MessageDigest mac = Crypto.getHMACT64(sk);
        int seq = SMBUtil.readInt4(mic, 12);
        mac.update(mic, 12, 4); // sequence
        byte[] dgst = mac.digest(data); // data

> Host: localhost:9000
> User-Agent: curl/7.81.0
> Accept: */*
>

2. The id_token self-contains the authorization information in a manner that can be verified. For example, by encoding authorization information along with a signature into the token.

WSO2 generates tokens in first style by default, but if to be used with MinIO we should configure WSO2 to provide JWT tokens instead.

### 3. Generate Self-contained Access Tokens

                }
            }

            /* Verification fails (w/ W2K3 server at least) if status is not 0. This
             * suggests MS doesn't compute the signature (correctly) for error responses
             * (perhaps for DOS reasons).
             */
            if (digest != null && resp.errorCode == 0) {
                digest.verify( BUF, 4, resp );
            }

			if !condPassed {
				return fmt.Errorf("Invalid according to Policy: Policy Condition failed: [%s, %s, %s]", op, policy.Key, policy.Value)
			}
		}
		delete(checkHeader, formCanonicalName)
	}
	// For SignV2 - Signature/AWSAccessKeyId field will be ignored.
	if _, ok := formValues[xhttp.AmzSignatureV2]; ok {
		delete(checkHeader, xhttp.AmzSignatureV2)
		for k := range checkHeader {
			// case-insensitivity for AWSAccessKeyId