DefaultDeny namespace annotation. Note: this will enforce policy for *all* pods in the namespace: ``` kubectl annotate namespace default "net.beta.kubernetes.io/network-policy={\"ingress\":{\"isolation\":\"DefaultDeny\"}}" ``` With NetworkPolicy enabled, traffic will be limited to just port 9000. For more precise policy, set `networkPolicy.allowExternal=true`. This will only allow pods with the generated client label to connect to MinIO. This label will be displayed in the output of a successful install....

DefaultDeny namespace annotation. Note: this will enforce policy for *all* pods in the namespace: ``` kubectl annotate namespace default "net.beta.kubernetes.io/network-policy={\"ingress\":{\"isolation\":\"DefaultDeny\"}}" ``` With NetworkPolicy enabled, traffic will be limited to just port 9000. For more precise policy, set `networkPolicy.allowExternal=true`. This will only allow pods with the generated client label to connect to MinIO. This label will be displayed in the output of a successful install....

DefaultDeny namespace annotation. Note: this will enforce policy for *all* pods in the namespace: ``` kubectl annotate namespace default "net.beta.kubernetes.io/network-policy={\"ingress\":{\"isolation\":\"DefaultDeny\"}}" ``` With NetworkPolicy enabled, traffic will be limited to just port 9000. For more precise policy, set `networkPolicy.allowExternal=true`. This will only allow pods with the generated client label to connect to MinIO. This label will be displayed in the output of a successful install....

- Kube-proxy: fix a bug on UDP NodePort Services where stale conntrack entries may blackhole the traffic directed to the NodePort. ([#98305](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/98305), [@aojea](https://github.com/aojea)) [SIG Network]

### Bug or Regression

* Incremental improvements to kubelet e2e tests ([#24426](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/24426), [@pwittrock](https://github.com/pwittrock))
* Bridge off-cluster traffic into services by masquerading. ([#24429](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/24429), [@cjcullen](https://github.com/cjcullen))

### CVE-2022-3172: Aggregated API server can cause clients to be redirected (SSRF)

A security issue was discovered in kube-apiserver that could allow an attacker controlled aggregated API server to redirect client traffic to any URL.  This could lead to the client performing unexpected actions as well as leaking the client's credentials to third parties. 

- Fix race condition in kube-proxy initialization that could blackhole UDP traffic to service VIP. ([#126687](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/126687), [@wedaly](https://github.com/wedaly)) [SIG Network]

	requestsRejectedSubsystem MetricSubsystem = "requests_rejected"
	timeSubsystem             MetricSubsystem = "time"
	ttfbSubsystem             MetricSubsystem = "requests_ttfb"
	trafficSubsystem          MetricSubsystem = "traffic"
	softwareSubsystem         MetricSubsystem = "software"
	sysCallSubsystem          MetricSubsystem = "syscall"
	usageSubsystem            MetricSubsystem = "usage"
	quotaSubsystem            MetricSubsystem = "quota"

- Fix race condition in kube-proxy initialization that could blackhole UDP traffic to service VIP. ([#126689](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/126689), [@wedaly](https://github.com/wedaly)) [SIG Network]

*   Graduate kube-proxy IPVS mode to beta. ([#56623](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/56623), [@m1093782566](https://github.com/m1093782566))

#### **Kube-Proxy**

*   Added iptables rules to allow Pod traffic even when default iptables policy is to reject. ([#52569](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/52569),[ @tmjd](https://github.com/tmjd))