// The prepared channel is used to synchronize the statement preparation state.
	cacheStmt := &Stmt{
		Transaction: isTransaction,
		prepared:    make(chan struct{}),
	}
	// Cache the Stmt object with the associated key.
	s.Set(key, cacheStmt)
	// Unlock after completing initialization to prevent deadlocks.
	locker.Unlock()

	// Ensure the prepared channel is closed after the function execution completes.

		Info: dataUsageCacheInfo{
			Name:      dataUsageRoot,
			NextCycle: oldCache.Info.NextCycle,
		},
		Cache: make(map[string]dataUsageEntry, len(oldCache.Cache)),
	}

	// Put all buckets into channel.
	bucketCh := make(chan BucketInfo, len(buckets))

	// Shuffle buckets to ensure total randomness of buckets, being scanned.
	// Otherwise same set of buckets get scanned across erasure sets always.

 */
package jcifs.internal.smb2.multichannel;

import org.junit.platform.suite.api.SelectClasses;
import org.junit.platform.suite.api.Suite;

/**
 * Test suite for SMB3 Multi-Channel functionality
 */
@Suite
@SelectClasses({ NetworkInterfaceInfoTest.class, ChannelInfoTest.class, ChannelLoadBalancerTest.class, ChannelFailoverTest.class,
        ChannelManagerTest.class })

		},
	}
	ticker := time.NewTicker(1 * time.Millisecond)
	defer ticker.Stop()
	for _, obs := range observations {
		// Send observations once every 1ms, to simulate delay between
		// observations. This is to test the channel based
		// synchronization used internally.
		<-ticker.C
		ttfbHist.With(prometheus.Labels{"api": obs.label}).Observe(obs.val)
	}

	metrics := getHistogramMetrics(ttfbHist, getBucketTTFBDistributionMD(), false, false)

	dw := &DeadlineWorker{
		timeout: timeout,
	}
	return dw
}

// Run runs the given function, passing it a stopper channel. If the deadline passes before
// the function finishes executing, Run returns context.DeadlineExceeded to the caller.
// channel so that the work function can attempt to exit gracefully.
// Multiple calls to Run will run independently of each other.

### Hardware attacks

Physical GPUs or TPUs can also be the target of attacks. [Published
research](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=gpu+side+channel) shows that it
might be possible to use side channel attacks on the GPU to leak data from other
running models or processes in the same system. GPUs can also have
implementation bugs that might allow attackers to leave malicious code running

import java.net.NetworkInterface;
import java.net.SocketException;
import java.nio.ByteBuffer;
import java.nio.ByteOrder;

import jcifs.internal.util.SMBUtil;

/**
 * Information about a network interface for SMB3 Multi-Channel
 */
public class NetworkInterfaceInfo {

    private int interfaceIndex;
    private int capability;
    private int linkSpeed; // In units of 1 Mbps
    private byte[] sockaddrStorage;

 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
 */
package jcifs.internal.smb2.rdma;

import jcifs.internal.util.SMBUtil;

/**
 * SMB2 RDMA Transform structure for READ/WRITE channel info.
 *
 * As per MS-SMB2 2.2.13.1.1 and 2.2.21.1.1
 */
public class Smb2RdmaTransform {

    // SMB_DIRECT_BUFFER_DESCRIPTOR_V1 structure
    private long offset; // 8 bytes: Offset within registered buffer

            EnumSet.of(RdmaAccess.LOCAL_WRITE, RdmaAccess.REMOTE_WRITE));
        
        try {
            // Create SMB2 Read request with RDMA read channel info
            request.addRdmaChannelInfo(readRegion.getRemoteKey(), 
                                     readRegion.getAddress(),
                                     readRegion.getSize());
            

// along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

package bpool

import (
	"github.com/klauspost/reedsolomon"
)

// BytePoolCap implements a leaky pool of []byte in the form of a bounded channel.
type BytePoolCap struct {
	c    chan []byte
	w    int
	wcap int
}

// NewBytePoolCap creates a new BytePool bounded to the given maxSize, with new
// byte arrays sized based on width.