if (logFilePath == null) {
            final String value = System.getProperty("fess.log.path");
            logFilePath = value != null ? value : new File(targetDir, "logs").getAbsolutePath();
        }
        cmdList.add("-Dfess.log.path=" + logFilePath);
        addSystemProperty(cmdList, "fess.log.name", getLogName("fess"), getLogName(StringUtil.EMPTY));
        if (logLevel == null) {

		Name:  "quiet",
		Usage: "disable startup and info messages",
	},
	cli.BoolFlag{
		Name:  "anonymous",
		Usage: "hide sensitive information from logging",
	},
	cli.BoolFlag{
		Name:  "json",
		Usage: "output logs in JSON format",
	},
	// Deprecated flag, so its hidden now, existing deployments will keep working.
	cli.BoolFlag{
		Name:   "compat",

success.upload_elevate_word=Uploaded Additional Word file.
success.upload_bad_word=Uploaded Bad Word file.
success.upload_mapping_file=Uploaded Mapping file.
success.send_testmail=Sent the test mail.
success.job_log_delete_all=Deleted job logs.
success.changed_password=Changed your password.
success.bulk_process_started=Bulk process is started.

success.crud_create_crud_table=Created data.
success.crud_update_crud_table=Updated data.

        "The account used is a Computer Account. Use your global user account or local user account to access this server.",
        "The user must change his password before he logs on the first time.",
        "NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND",
        "The referenced account is currently locked out and may not be logged on to.",
        "The remote system is not reachable by the transport.",

#!/usr/bin/env bash

echo "Running $0"

set -x

trap 'catch $LINENO' ERR

# shellcheck disable=SC2120
catch() {
	if [ $# -ne 0 ]; then
		echo "error on line $1"
		for site in sitea siteb; do
			echo "$site server logs ========="
			cat "/tmp/${site}_1.log"
			echo "==========================="
			cat "/tmp/${site}_2.log"
		done
	fi

	echo "Cleaning up instances of MinIO"
	pkill minio
	pkill -9 minio

### CVE-2024-5321: Incorrect permissions on Windows containers logs

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes clusters with Windows nodes
where BUILTIN\Users may be able to read container logs and NT
AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users may be able to modify container logs.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kubelet <= 1.27.15
  - kubelet <= 1.28.11
  - kubelet <= 1.29.6

	// global Listen system to send S3 API events to registered listeners
	globalHTTPListen = pubsub.New[event.Event, pubsub.Mask](0)

	// global console system to send console logs to
	// registered listeners
	globalConsoleSys *HTTPConsoleLoggerSys

	// All unique drives for this deployment
	globalEndpoints EndpointServerPools
	// All unique nodes for this deployment
	globalNodes []Node

// done per-"handler function registration" in the router.
//
// The passed in handler function must be a method of `adminAPIHandlers` for the
// name displayed in logs and trace to be accurate. The name is extracted via
// reflection.
//
// When no flags are passed, gzip compression, http tracing of headers and
// checking of object layer availability are all enabled. Use flags to modify

Interceptors
============

Interceptors are a powerful mechanism that can monitor, rewrite, and retry calls. Here's a simple interceptor that logs the outgoing request and the incoming response.

```java
class LoggingInterceptor implements Interceptor {
  @Override public Response intercept(Interceptor.Chain chain) throws IOException {
    Request request = chain.request();

    long t1 = System.nanoTime();

           * we catch everything. (Any Exception is either a RuntimeException or
           * sneaky checked exception.) With no better options, we log anything to the same
           * place as Closeables logs.
           */
          Closeables.logger.log(
              Level.WARNING, "Suppressing exception thrown when closing " + closeable, suppressed);
        }
      };