... und **FastAPI** verwendet dieselben Deklarationen, um:

* **Anforderungen** zu definieren: aus Anfrage-Pfadparametern, Abfrageparametern, Header-Feldern, Bodys, Abhängigkeiten, usw.
* **Daten umzuwandeln**: aus der Anfrage in den erforderlichen Typ.
* **Daten zu validieren**: aus jeder Anfrage:
    * **Automatische Fehler** generieren, die an den Client zurückgegeben werden, wenn die Daten ungültig sind.

# ========================================================================================
# Framework Default
# =================
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Lasta Taglib
# ------------
errors.header = <ul class="has-error">
errors.footer = </ul>
errors.prefix = <li><i class="fa fa-exclamation-circle"></i>
errors.suffix = </li>
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Javax Validator

func (f *formatter) formatString(b []byte, s string) {
	if len(s) > len(b) {
		f.err = ErrFieldTooLong
	}
	copy(b, s)
	if len(s) < len(b) {
		b[len(s)] = 0
	}

	// Some buggy readers treat regular files with a trailing slash
	// in the V7 path field as a directory even though the full path
	// recorded elsewhere (e.g., via PAX record) contains no trailing slash.
	if len(s) > len(b) && b[len(b)-1] == '/' {

# ========================================================================================
# Framework Default
# =================
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Lasta Taglib
# ------------
errors.header = <ul class="has-error">
errors.footer = </ul>
errors.prefix = <li><i class="fa fa-exclamation-circle"></i>
errors.suffix = </li>
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Javax Validator

    void testWithEmptyPipeName() {
        // Test with empty string
        String pipeName = "";
        FsctlPipeWaitRequest request = new FsctlPipeWaitRequest(pipeName);

        // Verify size (14 bytes header + 0 bytes for empty name)
        assertEquals(14, request.size());

        // Test encoding
        byte[] buffer = new byte[50];
        int bytesEncoded = request.encode(buffer, 0);

        // Verify

➡️ 💬 👆 💚 ⚫️ 📨 🔂 & 📁 🎻, 👆 💚 ⚙️ Orjson 🎛 `orjson.OPT_INDENT_2`.

👆 💪 ✍ `CustomORJSONResponse`. 👑 👜 👆 ✔️ ✍ `Response.render(content)` 👩‍🔬 👈 📨 🎚 `bytes`:

{* ../../docs_src/custom_response/tutorial009c.py hl[9:14,17] *}

🔜 ↩️ 🛬:

```json
{"message": "Hello World"}
```

...👉 📨 🔜 📨:

```json
{

### CVE-2022-3162: Unauthorized read of Custom Resources

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group they are not authorized to read.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.25.0 - v1.25.3

# ========================================================================================
# Framework Default
# =================
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Lasta Taglib
# ------------
errors.header = <ul class="has-error">
errors.footer = </ul>
errors.prefix = <li><i class="fa fa-exclamation-circle"></i>
errors.suffix = </li>
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Javax Validator

		}
		return err
	}
	if len(data) == 0 {
		// Seems to be empty create a new poolMeta object.
		return nil
	}
	if len(data) <= 4 {
		return fmt.Errorf("poolMeta: no data")
	}
	// Read header
	switch binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(data[0:2]) {
	case poolMetaFormat:
	default:
		return fmt.Errorf("poolMeta: unknown format: %d", binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(data[0:2]))
	}

🚥 👆 📂 👩‍💻 🧰, 👆 💪 👀 ❔ 📊 📨 🕴 🔌 🤝, 🔐 🕴 📨 🥇 📨 🔓 👩‍💻 & 🤚 👈 🔐 🤝, ✋️ 🚫 ⏮️:

<img src="/img/tutorial/security/image10.png">

/// note

👀 🎚 `Authorization`, ⏮️ 💲 👈 ▶️ ⏮️ `Bearer `.

///

## 🏧 ⚙️ ⏮️ `scopes`

Oauth2️⃣ ✔️ 🔑 "↔".

👆 💪 ⚙️ 👫 🚮 🎯 ⚒ ✔ 🥙 🤝.

⤴️ 👆 💪 🤝 👉 🤝 👩‍💻 🔗 ⚖️ 🥉 🥳, 🔗 ⏮️ 👆 🛠️ ⏮️ ⚒ 🚫.