testBlock.setUseUnicode(true);
            // Test reading Unicode string with alignment

            byte[] buffer = new byte[100];
            // Write "Test" in UTF-16LE directly at position 2 (even offset)
            System.arraycopy(Strings.getUNIBytes("Test\0"), 0, buffer, 2, 10);

            String result = testBlock.readString(buffer, 2);

            assertEquals("Test", result);

        CurlRequest request = new CurlRequest(Method.GET, "https://example.com");

        // Call gzip() and verify it sets compression
        request.gzip();

        // We can't directly access compression field, but we can verify the method returns this
        assertSame(request, request.gzip());
    }

    @Test
    public void testMultipleCompressionCalls() {

   *       to lead to trouble than an incompatible change would be.
   *   <li>We could make {@link #countMap} no longer be {@code final}. Then we could write to it
   *       directly during deserialization. However, we would lose Java's guarantees for {@code
   *       final} fields, including that their values are guaranteed to be visible even when an
   *       instance is unsafely published.
   * </ul>

   *       collections intelligently fall back to a binary search tree if hash table collisions are
   *       detected. Rather than going to all the trouble of reimplementing this ourselves, we
   *       simply switch over to use the JDK implementation wholesale if probable hash flooding is
   *       detected, sacrificing the compactness guarantee in very rare cases in exchange for much
   *       more reliable worst-case behavior.

		d.tracker.logSuccess()
	}
	return n, err
}

// diskHealthReader provides a wrapper that will update disk health on
// ctx, on every successful read.
// This should only be used directly at the os/syscall level,
// otherwise buffered operations may return false health checks.
func diskHealthReader(ctx context.Context, r io.Reader) io.Reader {
	// Check if context has a disk health check.

            // Intent detection
            final IntentDetectionResult intentResult = llmClientManager.detectIntent(userMessage, history);
            if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) {
                logger.debug("[RAG] Intent detected. intent={}, query={}", intentResult.getIntent(), intentResult.getQuery());
            }

            if (intentResult.getIntent() == ChatIntent.UNCLEAR) {

   * replace "Strong" with "Soft" or "Weak" within the pasted text. The primary difference is that
   * strong entries store the key reference directly while soft and weak entries delegate to their
   * respective superclasses.
   */

  /** Used for strongly-referenced keys. */
  private static class StrongEntry<K, V> extends AbstractReferenceEntry<K, V> {

        final Object value = initParamMap.get(AUTHENTICATIONS_PROPERTY);
        if (value == null) {
            return new Hc5Authentication[0];
        }

        // If already HC5 Hc5Authentication[], return directly
        if (value instanceof Hc5Authentication[]) {
            return (Hc5Authentication[]) value;
        }

        // If common POJO config, convert to HC5

   */
  @Deprecated
  @InlineMe(replacement = "collection.stream()")
  public static <T extends @Nullable Object> Stream<T> stream(Collection<T> collection) {
    return collection.stream();
  }

  /**
   * Returns a sequential {@link Stream} of the remaining contents of {@code iterator}. Do not use
   * {@code iterator} directly after passing it to this method.
   */

  - [Changelog since v1.22.13](#changelog-since-v12213)
  - [Important Security Information](#important-security-information-1)
    - [CVE-2022-3172: Aggregated API server can cause clients to be redirected (SSRF)](#cve-2022-3172-aggregated-api-server-can-cause-clients-to-be-redirected-ssrf)
    - [CVE-2021-25749: <code>runAsNonRoot</code> logic bypass for Windows containers](#cve-2021-25749-runasnonroot-logic-bypass-for-windows-containers)