if u.Credentials.IsTemp() {
				// We should delete such that the client can re-request
				// for the expiring credentials.
				deleteKeyEtcd(ctx, ies.client, getUserIdentityPath(user, userType))
				deleteKeyEtcd(ctx, ies.client, getMappedPolicyPath(user, userType, false))
			}
			return nil
		}
		u.Credentials.Claims = jwtClaims.Map()
	}
	if u.Credentials.Description == "" {

		}
	} else {
		// Temporary credentials are not allowed.
		if ui.Credentials.IsTemp() {
			return nil, errAuthentication
		}
		if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(ui.Credentials.SecretKey), pass) != 1 {
			return nil, errAuthentication
		}

	}

	copts := map[string]string{
		"AccessKey": ui.Credentials.AccessKey,
		"SecretKey": ui.Credentials.SecretKey,
	}
	if ui.Credentials.IsTemp() {

 */

package jcifs.smb;


import java.security.GeneralSecurityException;
import java.util.Arrays;

import jcifs.CIFSContext;


/**
 * This class stores and encrypts NTLM user credentials. The default
 * credentials are retrieved from the <tt>jcifs.smb.client.domain</tt>,
 * <tt>jcifs.smb.client.username</tt>, and <tt>jcifs.smb.client.password</tt>
 * properties.
 * <p>

# Upload with server side encryption, using temporary credentials
s3.meta.client.upload_file('/etc/hosts',
                           'testbucket',
                           'hosts',
                           ExtraArgs={'ServerSideEncryption': 'AES256'})

# Download encrypted object using temporary credentials

  # ci/official/utilities/setup_docker.sh.
else
  # The volume mapping flag below shares the user's gcloud credentials, if any,
  # with the container, in case the user has credentials stored there.
  # This would allow Bazel to authenticate for RBE.
  # Note: TF's CI does not have any credentials stored there.
  TFCI_DOCKER_ARGS="$TFCI_DOCKER_ARGS -v $HOME/.config/gcloud:/root/.config/gcloud"

    response = client.get("/users/me", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer nonexistent"})
    assert response.status_code == 401, response.text
    assert response.json() == {"detail": "Could not validate credentials"}
    assert response.headers["WWW-Authenticate"] == 'Bearer scope="me"'


@needs_py39
def test_incorrect_token_type(client: TestClient):
    response = client.get(

def test_incorrect_token():
    response = client.get("/users/me", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer nonexistent"})
    assert response.status_code == 401, response.text
    assert response.json() == {"detail": "Could not validate credentials"}
    assert response.headers["WWW-Authenticate"] == 'Bearer scope="me"'


def test_incorrect_token_type():
    response = client.get(
        "/users/me", headers={"Authorization": "Notexistent testtoken"}
    )

⤴️ 👥 💪 ⚙️ `secrets.compare_digest()` 🚚 👈 `credentials.username` `"stanleyjobson"`, & 👈 `credentials.password` `"swordfish"`.

```Python hl_lines="1  11-21"
{!../../docs_src/security/tutorial007.py!}
```

👉 🔜 🎏:

```Python
if not (credentials.username == "stanleyjobson") or not (credentials.password == "swordfish"):
    # Return some error
    ...
```

                                 endpoint_url='http://localhost:9000',
                                 aws_access_key_id=response['Credentials']['AccessKeyId'],
                                 aws_secret_access_key=response['Credentials']['SecretAccessKey'],
                                 aws_session_token=response['Credentials']['SessionToken'],
                                 config=Config(signature_version='s3v4'),

	type: TYPE # valid values are "minio"
	bucket: BUCKET
	prefix: PREFIX
	# NOTE: if source is remote then target must be "local"
	# endpoint: ENDPOINT
	# credentials:
	#   accessKey: ACCESS-KEY
	#   secretKey: SECRET-KEY
	#   sessionToken: SESSION-TOKEN # Available when rotating credentials are used

  # target where the objects must be replicated
  target:
	type: TYPE # valid values are "minio"
	bucket: BUCKET
	prefix: PREFIX