if rec.Code != accessDenied {
		t.Fatal(failTestStr(anonTestStr, fmt.Sprintf("Object API Nil Test expected to fail with %d, but failed with %d", accessDenied, rec.Code)))
	}

	// HEAD HTTTP request doesn't contain response body.
	if anonReq.Method != http.MethodHead {
		// read the response body.
		var actualContent []byte
		actualContent, err = io.ReadAll(rec.Body)
		if err != nil {

// For slices, clear sets all elements up to the length of the slice
// to the zero value of the respective element type. If the argument
// type is a type parameter, the type parameter's type set must
// contain only map or slice types, and clear performs the operation
// implied by the type argument.
func clear[T ~[]Type | ~map[Type]Type1](t T)

// The close built-in function closes a channel, which must be either

	c.Assert(response.StatusCode, http.StatusOK)

	objectName := "prefix/myobject"
	delObjReq := DeleteObjectsRequest{
		Quiet: false,
	}
	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
		// Obtain http request to upload object.
		// object Name contains a prefix.
		objName := fmt.Sprintf("%d/%s", i, objectName)
		request, err = newTestSignedRequest(http.MethodPut, getPutObjectURL(s.endPoint, bucketName, objName),

		tx.RowsAffected = rowsAffected
	default:
		tx = db.getInstance()
		tx.Statement.Dest = value
		tx = tx.callbacks.Create().Execute(tx)
	}
	return
}

// Save updates value in database. If value doesn't contain a matching primary key, value is inserted.
func (db *DB) Save(value interface{}) (tx *DB) {
	tx = db.getInstance()
	tx.Statement.Dest = value

	reflectValue := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(value))

	},
	ErrInvalidObjectName: {
		Code:           "XMinioInvalidObjectName",
		Description:    "Object name contains unsupported characters.",
		HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
	},
	ErrInvalidObjectNamePrefixSlash: {
		Code:           "XMinioInvalidObjectName",
		Description:    "Object name contains a leading slash.",
		HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
	},
	ErrInvalidResourceName: {

	// An encrypted ETag must be at least 32 bytes long.
	// It contains the encrypted ETag value + an authentication
	// code generated by the AEAD cipher.
	//
	// Here is an incorrect implementation of IsEncrypted:
	//
	//   return len(e) > 16 && !bytes.ContainsRune(e, '-')
	//
	// An encrypted ETag may contain some random bytes - e.g.
	// and nonce value. This nonce value may contain a '-'
	// just by its nature of being randomly generated.

		s = s[i+len(sep):]
	}
}

// Contains reports whether subslice is within b.
func Contains(b, subslice []byte) bool {
	return Index(b, subslice) != -1
}

// ContainsAny reports whether any of the UTF-8-encoded code points in chars are within b.
func ContainsAny(b []byte, chars string) bool {
	return IndexAny(b, chars) >= 0
}

// ContainsRune reports whether the rune is contained in the UTF-8-encoded byte slice b.

	// so we do not want to override them, copy them instead.
	for k, v := range encMetadata {
		srcInfo.UserDefined[k] = v
	}

	// Ensure that metadata does not contain sensitive information
	crypto.RemoveSensitiveEntries(srcInfo.UserDefined)

	// If we see legacy source, metadataOnly we have to overwrite the content.
	if srcInfo.Legacy {
		srcInfo.metadataOnly = false
	}

	if !strings.HasSuffix(ret.host, ":443") {
		ret.host += ":443"
	}
	const projSeg = "/projects/"
	i := strings.Index(u.Path, projSeg)
	if i == -1 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("webhook URL %s doesn't contain the projects segment", u)
	}
	i += len(projSeg)
	j := strings.IndexByte(u.Path[i:], '/')
	if j == -1 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("webhook URL %s is malformed", u)
	}
	ret.gcpProject = u.Path[i : i+j]

	// so we do not want to override them, copy them instead.
	for k, v := range encMetadata {
		metadata[k] = v
	}

	// Ensure that metadata does not contain sensitive information
	crypto.RemoveSensitiveEntries(metadata)

	if isCompressible(r.Header, object) {
		// Storing the compression metadata.
		metadata[ReservedMetadataPrefix+"compression"] = compressionAlgorithmV2