- [Changelog since v1.30.8](#changelog-since-v1308)
  - [Important Security Information](#important-security-information-1)
    - [CVE-2024-9042: Command Injection affecting Windows nodes via nodes/*/logs/query API](#cve-2024-9042-command-injection-affecting-windows-nodes-via-nodeslogsquery-api)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-5)
    - [API Change](#api-change)
    - [Feature](#feature-3)

  - [Changelog since v1.31.4](#changelog-since-v1314)
  - [Important Security Information](#important-security-information-2)
    - [CVE-2024-9042: Command Injection affecting Windows nodes via nodes/*/logs/query API](#cve-2024-9042-command-injection-affecting-windows-nodes-via-nodeslogsquery-api)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-7)
    - [API Change](#api-change)
    - [Feature](#feature-4)

 * @since 10.0
 */
@GwtCompatible
public final class UnsignedLongs {
  private UnsignedLongs() {}

  public static final long MAX_VALUE = -1L; // Equivalent to 2^64 - 1

  /**
   * A (self-inverse) bijection which converts the ordering on unsigned longs to the ordering on
   * longs, that is, {@code a <= b} as unsigned longs if and only if {@code flip(a) <= flip(b)} as
   * signed longs.
   */
  private static long flip(long a) {

        normalizedPath = noUncValidator.validatePath("////server//share");
        assertEquals("\\server\\share", normalizedPath);

        // To properly test UNC rejection, we would need to fix the normalization logic
        // to preserve the leading double backslash for UNC paths
    }

    @Test
    public void testInvalidUncPath() throws Exception {

   * types that contain an embedded IPv4 address.
   *
   * <p>NOTE: ISATAP addresses are explicitly excluded from this method due to their trivial
   * spoofability. With other transition addresses spoofing involves (at least) infection of one's
   * BGP routing table.
   *
   * @param ip {@link Inet6Address} to be examined for embedded IPv4 client address
   * @return {@code true} if there is an embedded IPv4 client address
   * @since 7.0
   */

 * but given that any public suffix may become a host without warning, it is better to err on the
 * side of permissiveness and thus avoid spurious rejection of valid sites. Of course, to actually
 * determine addressability of any host, clients of this class will need to perform their own DNS
 * lookups.
 *
 * <p>During construction, names are normalized in two ways:
 *

   * types that contain an embedded IPv4 address.
   *
   * <p>NOTE: ISATAP addresses are explicitly excluded from this method due to their trivial
   * spoofability. With other transition addresses spoofing involves (at least) infection of one's
   * BGP routing table.
   *
   * @param ip {@link Inet6Address} to be examined for embedded IPv4 client address
   * @return {@code true} if there is an embedded IPv4 client address
   * @since 7.0
   */

    return (ImmutableSet<E>) RegularImmutableSet.EMPTY;
  }

  /**
   * Returns an immutable set containing the given element. Preferred over {@link
   * Collections#singleton} for code consistency, {@code null} rejection, and because the return
   * type conveys the immutability guarantee.
   */
  public static <E> ImmutableSet<E> of(E e1) {
    return new SingletonImmutableSet<>(e1);
  }

  /*

                    throw new RuntimeException(e);
                }
            });
        } catch (SimpleCircuitBreaker.CircuitBreakerOpenException e) {
            // Log circuit breaker rejection
            auditLogger.logSecurityViolation("Circuit breaker open for SMB connection",
                    java.util.Map.of("address", address.getHostAddress(), "port", String.valueOf(port)));

### Bug or Regression