assertTrue(ntlmTargetName, "Should delegate NTLM target name setting");
        assertFalse(port139Failover, "Should delegate port 139 failover setting");
        assertTrue(dfsStrictView, "Should delegate DFS strict view setting");

        verify(mockDelegate).isUseSMB2OnlyNegotiation();
        verify(mockDelegate).isRequireSecureNegotiate();
        verify(mockDelegate).isSendNTLMTargetName();

 * decimal digits and dots. This pattern matches strings like "a:.23" and "54" that are neither IP
 * addresses nor hostnames; they will be verified as IP addresses (which is a more strict
 * verification).
 */
private val VERIFY_AS_IP_ADDRESS = "([0-9a-fA-F]*:[0-9a-fA-F:.]*)|([\\d.]+)".toRegex()

/** Returns true if this string is not a host name and might be an IP address. */

      cookieBuilder.sameSite(" a ").build()
    }

    cookieBuilder.sameSite("a").build()
  }

  @ParameterizedTest(name = "{displayName}({arguments})")
  @ValueSource(strings = ["Lax", "Strict", "UnrecognizedButValid"])
  fun builderSameSite(sameSite: String) {
    val cookie =
      Cookie
        .Builder()
        .name("a")
        .value("b")
        .domain("example.com")

  /** The Greek letter delta, used in unicode testing. */
  private static final String DELTA = "\u0394";

  /** A domain part which is valid under lenient validation, but invalid under strict validation. */
  @SuppressWarnings("InlineMeInliner") // String.repeat unavailable under Java 8
  static final String LOTS_OF_DELTAS = Strings.repeat(DELTA, 62);

CONTRIBUTORS SHALL HAVE ANY LIABILITY FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING WITHOUT LIMITATION
LOST PROFITS), HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY
WAY OUT OF THE USE OR DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROGRAM OR THE EXERCISE OF ANY RIGHTS
GRANTED HEREUNDER, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

 */

a&&e.call(this,a[s],s,a))return!0;return!1};var f=M.momentProperties=[],a=!1;function p(e,a){var t,s,n;if(r(a._isAMomentObject)||(e._isAMomentObject=a._isAMomentObject),r(a._i)||(e._i=a._i),r(a._f)||(e._f=a._f),r(a._l)||(e._l=a._l),r(a._strict)||(e._strict=a._strict),r(a._tzm)||(e._tzm=a._tzm),r(a._isUTC)||(e._isUTC=a._isUTC),r(a._offset)||(e._offset=a._offset),r(a._pf)||(e._pf=L(a)),r(a._locale)||(e._locale=a._locale),0<f.length)for(t=0;t<f.length;t++)r(n=a[s=f[t]])||(e[s]=n);return e}function k...

  //   so that it looks like we timed out even though we didn't. For comparison FutureTask respects
  //   completion preferably and AQS is non-deterministic (depends on where in the queue the waiter
  //   is). If we wanted to be strict about it, we could store the unpark() time in the Waiter node
  //   and we could use that to make a decision about whether or not we timed out prior to being
  //   unparked.

  @SuppressWarnings({

   *    originating the navigation, and the subject is the page being navigated to.
   *
   * The values of this attribute determine whether this cookie is sent for cross-site calls:
   *
   *  - "Strict": the cookie is omitted when the subject URL is an embedded resource or a
   *    potentially-destructive navigation.
   *
   *  - "Lax": the cookie is omitted when the subject URL is an embedded resource. It is sent for

 *  Fix: Acknowledge and apply inbound HTTP/2 settings atomically. Previously we had a race where we
    could use new flow control capacity before acknowledging it, causing strict HTTP/2 servers to
    fail the call.

 *  Fix: Recover gracefully when a coalesced connection immediately goes unhealthy.

## Version 3.14.2

_2019-05-19_