if r.contentHasher != nil {
			if r.contentHash.Type.Trailing() {
				var err error
				r.contentHash.Encoded = r.trailer.Get(r.contentHash.Type.Key())
				r.contentHash.Raw, err = base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(r.contentHash.Encoded)
				if err != nil || len(r.contentHash.Raw) == 0 {
					return 0, ChecksumMismatch{Got: r.contentHash.Encoded}
				}
			}
			if sum := r.contentHasher.Sum(nil); !bytes.Equal(r.contentHash.Raw, sum) {

	IV        []byte
	Nonce     []byte
	Bytes     []byte
}

// UnmarshalJSON parses the given text as JSON-encoded
// ciphertext.
//
// UnmarshalJSON provides backward-compatible unmarsahaling
// of existing ciphertext. In the past, ciphertexts were
// JSON-encoded. Now, ciphertexts are binary-encoded.
// Therefore, there is no MarshalJSON implementation.
func (c *ciphertext) UnmarshalJSON(text []byte) error {
	const (

)

// getDataBlockLen - get length of data blocks from encoded blocks.
func getDataBlockLen(enBlocks [][]byte, dataBlocks int) int {
	size := 0
	// Figure out the data block length.
	for _, block := range enBlocks[:dataBlocks] {
		size += len(block)
	}
	return size
}

// Writes all the data blocks from encoded blocks until requested
// outSize length. Provides a way to skip bytes until the offset.

// CertificateSigningRequestSpec contains the certificate request.
message CertificateSigningRequestSpec {
  // request contains an x509 certificate signing request encoded in a "CERTIFICATE REQUEST" PEM block.
  // When serialized as JSON or YAML, the data is additionally base64-encoded.
  // +listType=atomic
  optional bytes request = 1;

  // signerName indicates the requested signer, and is a qualified name.
  //

  fun toUriWithControlCharacters() {
    // Percent-encoded in the path.
    assertThat("http://host/a\u0000b".toHttpUrl().toUri())
      .isEqualTo(URI("http://host/a%00b"))
    assertThat("http://host/a\u0080b".toHttpUrl().toUri())
      .isEqualTo(URI("http://host/a%C2%80b"))
    assertThat("http://host/a\u009fb".toHttpUrl().toUri())
      .isEqualTo(URI("http://host/a%C2%9Fb"))
    // Percent-encoded in the query.

 *
 * b0
 * --
 *
 * The inclusive start of the range. We get the first 14 bits of this code point from the section
 * and the last 7 bits from this byte.
 *
 * The end of the range is not encoded, but can be inferred by looking at the start of the range
 * that follows.
 *
 * b1
 * --
 *
 * This is either a mapping decision or the length of the mapped output, according to this table:
 *
 * ```

		{"   a   b  c   ", "a b c"},
		{"a \t b  c   ", "a b c"},
		{"\"a \t b  c   ", "\"a b c"},
		{" \t\n\u000b\r\fa \t\n\u000b\r\f b \t\n\u000b\r\f c \t\n\u000b\r\f", "a b c"},
	}

	// Tests generated values from url encoded name.
	for i, testCase := range testCases {
		result := signV4TrimAll(testCase.inputStr)
		if testCase.result != result {

	v := BaseOptions{}
	var buf bytes.Buffer
	msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)

	m := v.Msgsize()
	if buf.Len() > m {
		t.Log("WARNING: TestEncodeDecodeBaseOptions Msgsize() is inaccurate")
	}

	vn := BaseOptions{}
	err := msgp.Decode(&buf, &vn)
	if err != nil {
		t.Error(err)
	}

	buf.Reset()
	msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
	err = msgp.NewReader(&buf).Skip()
	if err != nil {
		t.Error(err)
	}

 *  Fix: Verify certificate IP addresses in canonical form. When a server presents a TLS certificate
    containing an IP address we must match that address against the URL's IP address, even when the
    two addresses are encoded differently, such as `192.168.1.1` and `0::0:0:FFFF:C0A8:101`. Note
    that OkHttp incorrectly rejected valid certificates resulting in a failure to connect; at no
    point were invalid certificates accepted.

	v := BucketReplicationStat{}
	var buf bytes.Buffer
	msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)

	m := v.Msgsize()
	if buf.Len() > m {
		t.Log("WARNING: TestEncodeDecodeBucketReplicationStat Msgsize() is inaccurate")
	}

	vn := BucketReplicationStat{}
	err := msgp.Decode(&buf, &vn)
	if err != nil {
		t.Error(err)
	}

	buf.Reset()
	msgp.Encode(&buf, &v)
	err = msgp.NewReader(&buf).Skip()
	if err != nil {
		t.Error(err)