*/

  public void testInitialCapacity_negative() {
    MapMaker maker = new MapMaker();
    assertThrows(IllegalArgumentException.class, () -> maker.initialCapacity(-1));
  }

  // TODO(cpovirk): enable when ready (apparently after a change to our GWT emulation)
  public void xtestInitialCapacity_setTwice() {
    MapMaker maker = new MapMaker().initialCapacity(16);
    try {
      // even to the same value is not allowed

name: "Close Missing Playground issues"
on:
  schedule:
  - cron: "*/10 * * * *"

permissions:
  contents: read

jobs:
  stale:
    permissions:
      issues: write  # for actions/stale to close stale issues
      pull-requests: write  # for actions/stale to close stale PRs
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      ACTIONS_STEP_DEBUG: true
    steps:
    - name: Close Stale Issues
      uses: actions/stale@v8
      with:

	loadMRF := func(rc io.ReadCloser, opCh chan PartialOperation) error {
		defer rc.Close()
		var data [4]byte
		n, err := rc.Read(data[:])
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		if n != len(data) {
			return errors.New("heal mrf: no data")
		}
		// Read resync meta header
		switch binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(data[0:2]) {
		case healMRFMetaFormat:
		default:

 * values may be removed from the map on each map modification or on occasional map accesses; such
 * entries may be counted by {@link Map#size}, but will never be visible to read or write
 * operations. A partially-reclaimed entry is never exposed to the user. Any {@link Map.Entry}
 * instance retrieved from the map's {@linkplain Map#entrySet entry set} is a snapshot of that

This release contains changes that address the following vulnerabilities:

### CVE-2022-3162: Unauthorized read of Custom Resources

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group they are not authorized to read.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.25.0 - v1.25.3

      val ttl = buf.readInt().toLong() and 0xffffffffL // ttl
      val length = buf.readShort().toInt() and 0xffff

      if (type == TYPE_A || type == TYPE_AAAA) {
        val bytes = ByteArray(length)
        buf.read(bytes)
        result.add(InetAddress.getByAddress(bytes))
      } else {
        buf.skip(length.toLong())
      }
    }

    return result
  }

  @Throws(EOFException::class)

import com.google.common.collect.Multisets;
import com.google.common.collect.testing.features.CollectionSize;
import org.junit.Ignore;

/**
 * A generic JUnit test which tests multiset-specific read operations. Can't be invoked directly;
 * please see {@link com.google.common.collect.testing.SetTestSuiteBuilder}.
 *
 * @author Jared Levy
 */
@GwtCompatible

import com.google.common.collect.Multisets;
import com.google.common.collect.testing.features.CollectionSize;
import org.junit.Ignore;

/**
 * A generic JUnit test which tests multiset-specific read operations. Can't be invoked directly;
 * please see {@link com.google.common.collect.testing.SetTestSuiteBuilder}.
 *
 * @author Jared Levy
 */
@GwtCompatible

`/<user-running-minio>/.minio/certs`.

*Tip*: In a standard Kubernetes configuration, this will be `/root/.minio/certs`. Kubernetes will mount the secrets volume read-only,

            return new Metadata(new MetadataStaxReader().read(in, false));
        } catch (FileNotFoundException e) {
            throw new RepositoryMetadataReadException("Cannot read metadata from '" + mappingFile + "'", e);
        } catch (IOException | XMLStreamException e) {
            throw new RepositoryMetadataReadException(
                    "Cannot read metadata from '" + mappingFile + "': " + e.getMessage(), e);
        }