Kubernetes supports node proxying, which allows clients of kube-apiserver to access endpoints of a Kubelet to establish connections to Pods, retrieve container logs, and more. While Kubernetes already validates the proxying address for Nodes, a bug in kube-apiserver made it possible to bypass this validation. Bypassing this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to be redirected to the API Server through its private network.

        Address address = nameServiceClient.getByName("localhost", false);

        // Then
        assertNotNull(address, "Should return address for localhost");
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Should validate context configuration access")
    void testContextAccess() {
        // When
        NameServiceClientImpl client = new NameServiceClientImpl(mockContext);

        // Then

                    @Nonnull Nature nature) {
                super(session, trace);
                this.artifactCoordinates = requireNonNull(artifactCoordinates);
                this.repositories = validate(repositories);
                this.nature = requireNonNull(nature);
            }

            @Nonnull
            @Override
            public ArtifactCoordinates getArtifactCoordinates() {

func ConnectWS(dial ContextDialer, auth AuthFn, tls *tls.Config) func(ctx context.Context, remote string) (net.Conn, error) {
	return ConnectWSWithRoutePath(dial, auth, tls, RoutePath)
}

// ValidateTokenFn must validate the token and return an error if it is invalid.

     * @return action response with the search results or error page
     */
    @Execute
    @Secured({ ROLE })
    public ActionResponse upload(final UploadForm form) {
        validate(form, messages -> {}, () -> asListHtml(null));
        verifyTokenKeep(() -> asListHtml(this::saveToken));

        String header = null;
        final StringBuilder buf = new StringBuilder(1000);

errors.header = <ul class="has-error">
errors.footer = </ul>
errors.prefix = <li><i class="fa fa-exclamation-circle"></i>
errors.suffix = </li>
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Javax Validator
# ---------------
constraints.AssertFalse.message = {item} moet onwaar zijn.
constraints.AssertTrue.message = {item} moet waar zijn.
constraints.DecimalMax.message = {item} moet kleiner zijn dan {value}.

errors.header = <ul class="has-error">
errors.footer = </ul>
errors.prefix = <li><i class="fa fa-exclamation-circle"></i>
errors.suffix = </li>
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Javax Validator
# ---------------
constraints.AssertFalse.message = {item} должно быть ложным.
constraints.AssertTrue.message = {item} должно быть истинным.
constraints.DecimalMax.message = {item} должно быть меньше {value}.

errors.header = <ul class="has-error">
errors.footer = </ul>
errors.prefix = <li><i class="fa fa-exclamation-circle"></i>
errors.suffix = </li>
# ----------------------------------------------------------
# Javax Validator
# ---------------
constraints.AssertFalse.message = {item} 必須為 false。
constraints.AssertTrue.message = {item} 必須為 true。
constraints.DecimalMax.message = {item} 必須小於 {value}。

			[]byte("10000;chunk-signature=ad80c730a21e5b8d04586a2213dd63b9a0e99e0e2307b0ade35a65485a288648    \t \n"),
			[]byte("10000"),
			[]byte("ad80c730a21e5b8d04586a2213dd63b9a0e99e0e2307b0ade35a65485a288648"),
		},
	}
	// Validate chunk extension removal.
	for i, tt := range tests {
		// Extract chunk size and chunk signature after parsing a standard chunk-extension format.
		hexChunkSize, hexChunkSignature := parseS3ChunkExtension(tt.buf)

	}
	return dst
}

// invertSparseEntries converts a sparse map from one form to the other.
// If the input is sparseHoles, then it will output sparseDatas and vice-versa.
// The input must have been already validated.
//
// This function mutates src and returns a normalized map where:
//   - adjacent fragments are coalesced together
//   - only the last fragment may be empty