podUID:       types.UID(req.PathParameter("uid")),
	}
}

type responder struct{}

func (r *responder) Error(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, err error) {
	klog.ErrorS(err, "Error while proxying request")
	http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusInternalServerError)
}

// proxyStream proxies stream to url.
func proxyStream(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, url *url.URL) {

	var proxy proxyResult
	gr, err := getObjectNInfo(ctx, bucket, object, rs, r.Header, opts)
	if err != nil {
		var (
			reader *GetObjectReader
			perr   error
		)
		// avoid proxying if version is a delete marker
		if !isErrMethodNotAllowed(err) && !(gr != nil && gr.ObjInfo.DeleteMarker) {
			proxytgts := getProxyTargets(ctx, bucket, object, opts)
			if !proxytgts.Empty() {

type ReplicationControllerList struct {
	metav1.TypeMeta
	// +optional
	metav1.ListMeta

	Items []ReplicationController
}

const (
	// ClusterIPNone - do not assign a cluster IP
	// no proxying required and no environment variables should be created for pods
	ClusterIPNone = "None"
)

// +k8s:deepcopy-gen:interfaces=k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/runtime.Object

// ServiceList holds a list of services.

### CVE-2022-3294: Node address isn't always verified when proxying

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can to modify Node objects and send requests proxying through them.

### CVE-2022-3294: Node address isn't always verified when proxying

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can to modify Node objects and send requests proxying through them.

### CVE-2022-3294: Node address isn't always verified when proxying

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can to modify Node objects and send requests proxying through them.

### CVE-2022-3294: Node address isn't always verified when proxying

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can to modify Node objects and send requests proxying through them.

## Metrics Changes

### Added metrics

- The metric `kube_proxy_sync_proxy_rules_last_timestamp_seconds` is now available, indicating the last time that kube-proxy successfully applied proxying rules. ([#74027](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/74027), [@squeed](https://github.com/squeed))

	// ServiceTypeExternalName means a service consists of only a reference to
	// an external name that kubedns or equivalent will return as a CNAME
	// record, with no exposing or proxying of any pods involved.
	ServiceTypeExternalName ServiceType = "ExternalName"
)

// ServiceInternalTrafficPolicy describes how nodes distribute service traffic they
// receive on the ClusterIP.
// +enum

  // empty string (""), or a valid IP address. Setting this to "None" makes a
  // "headless service" (no virtual IP), which is useful when direct endpoint
  // connections are preferred and proxying is not required.  Only applies to
  // types ClusterIP, NodePort, and LoadBalancer. If this field is specified
  // when creating a Service of type ExternalName, creation will fail. This