* "The .NET Developer's Guide to Windows Security" (which is also
 * available online).
 * <p>
 * Direct ACEs are evaluated first in order. The SID of the user performing
 * the operation and the desired access bits are compared to the SID
 * and access mask of each ACE. If the SID matches, the allow/deny flags
 * and access mask are considered. If the ACE is a "deny"
 * ACE and <i>any</i> of the desired access bits match bits in the access

    if (roundArbitrarilyAsLong == Long.MAX_VALUE) {
      /*
       * For most values, the conversion from roundArbitrarily to roundArbitrarilyAsLong is
       * lossless. In that case we can compare x to roundArbitrarily using Long.compare(x,
       * roundArbitrarilyAsLong). The exception is for values where the conversion to double rounds
       * up to give roundArbitrarily equal to 2^63, so the conversion back to long overflows and

                        }
                    });
                    // Remove duplicates (equal adjacent elements) - a new, un@Incubating type will be here twice, as 2 errors are reported; use stringified JSON to compare
                    // Filtering an array is NOT in place
                    result.acceptedApiChanges = result.acceptedApiChanges.filter((item, pos, ary) => (!pos || (JSON.stringify(item) != JSON.stringify(ary[pos - 1]))));

		assert.Equal(t, actual, expected)
	})

	// Test generate option 'false', should modify webhooks
	testGenerateOption(t, false, func(t *testing.T, actual, expected []admitv1.MutatingWebhook) {
		if err := assert.Compare(actual, expected); err == nil {
			t.Errorf("expected diff between webhooks, got none")
		}
	})

	request.Header.Set("If-Modified-Since", t.Add(10*time.Minute).UTC().Format(http.TimeFormat))
	response, err = s.client.Do(request)
	c.Assert(err, nil)
	// Since the "If-Modified-Since" header was ahead in time compared to the actual
	// modified time of the object expecting the response status to be http.StatusNotModified.
	c.Assert(response.StatusCode, http.StatusNotModified)

	// Again, obtain the object info.

- github.com/google/cel-go: [v0.17.7 → v0.17.8](https://github.com/google/cel-go/compare/v0.17.7...v0.17.8)
- github.com/onsi/ginkgo/v2: [v2.13.0 → v2.15.0](https://github.com/onsi/ginkgo/compare/v2.13.0...v2.15.0)
- github.com/onsi/gomega: [v1.29.0 → v1.31.0](https://github.com/onsi/gomega/compare/v1.29.0...v1.31.0)

and utilities for concurrency, I/O, hashing, primitives, strings, and more! It
is widely used on most Java projects within Google, and widely used by many
other companies as well.



Guava comes in two flavors:

*   The JRE flavor requires JDK 1.8 or higher.
*   If you need support for Android, use
    [the Android flavor](https://github.com/google/guava/wiki/Android). You can

if [ "${expected_checksum}" != "${got_checksum}" ]; then
	echo "BUG: decommission failed on encrypted objects: expected ${expected_checksum} got ${got_checksum}"
	exit 1
fi

# after decommissioning, compare listings in bucket2 and tiered
./mc version info myminio/bucket2 | grep -q "versioning is enabled"
ret=$?
if [ $ret -ne 0 ]; then
	echo "BUG: expected versioning enabled after decommission on bucket2"
	exit 1
fi

 * "The .NET Developer's Guide to Windows Security" (which is also
 * available online).
 * <p>
 * Direct ACEs are evaluated first in order. The SID of the user performing
 * the operation and the desired access bits are compared to the SID
 * and access mask of each ACE. If the SID matches, the allow/deny flags
 * and access mask are considered. If the ACE is a "deny"
 * ACE and <i>any</i> of the desired access bits match bits in the access

Pour plus de détails, consultez la section [Déploiement](deployment/index.md){.internal-link target=_blank}.

///

## Benchmarks et vitesse