return OptionalEntity.empty();
    }

    /**
     * Retrieves a paginated list of character mapping items.
     *
     * @param offset the starting index for pagination (0-based)
     * @param size the maximum number of items to return
     * @return a PagingList containing the requested subset of mapping items
     */
    @Override
    public synchronized PagingList<CharMappingItem> selectList(final int offset, final int size) {

your report:

  - A descriptive title
  - Your name and affiliation (if any).
  - A description of the technical details of the vulnerabilities.
  - A minimal example of the vulnerability. It is very important to let us know
    how we can reproduce your findings. For memory corruption triggerable in
    TensorFlow models, please demonstrate an exploit against one of Alphabet's

/// tip | Dica

Aqui estamos usando `Query()` porque este é um **parâmetro de consulta**. Mais adiante veremos outros como `Path()`, `Body()`, `Header()` e `Cookie()`, que também aceitam os mesmos argumentos que `Query()`.

///

Agora o FastAPI vai:

* **Validar** os dados garantindo que o comprimento máximo seja de 50 caracteres

        // Verify DFS name is set to server name
        assertEquals(TEST_SERVER, dfsRootEnum.dfs_name);

        // Verify preferred max length is set to maximum
        assertEquals(0xFFFF, dfsRootEnum.prefmaxlen);

        // Verify totalentries is initialized
        assertNotNull(dfsRootEnum.totalentries);
    }

    @Test

        assertEquals(0, response.readDataWireFormat(buffer, 99, 0));
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test boundary conditions for read methods with maximum length")
    void testReadMethodsWithMaxLength() {
        // Arrange
        byte[] buffer = new byte[100];

        // Act & Assert

import okhttp3.internal.connection.RealCall.CallReference
import okhttp3.internal.okHttpName
import okhttp3.internal.platform.Platform

class RealConnectionPool internal constructor(
  taskRunner: TaskRunner,
  /** The maximum number of idle connections across all addresses. */
  private val maxIdleConnections: Int,
  keepAliveDuration: Long,
  timeUnit: TimeUnit,
  internal val connectionListener: ConnectionListener,
) {

        streamId = streamId,
        length = 4,
        type = TYPE_RST_STREAM,
        flags = FLAG_NONE,
      )
      sink.writeInt(errorCode.httpCode)
      sink.flush()
    }
  }

  /** The maximum size of bytes that may be sent in a single call to [data]. */
  fun maxDataLength(): Int = maxFrameSize

  /**
   * `source.length` may be longer than the max length of the variant's data frame. Implementations

	"runtime"
	"sync"
	"sync/atomic"

	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/logger"
	"github.com/minio/minio/internal/store"
	"github.com/minio/pkg/v3/workers"
)

const (
	logSubsys = "notify"

	// The maximum allowed number of concurrent Send() calls to all configured notifications targets
	maxConcurrentAsyncSend = 50000
)

// Target - event target interface
type Target interface {
	ID() TargetID
	IsActive() (bool, error)

		HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
	},
	ErrEntityTooLarge: {
		Code:           "EntityTooLarge",
		Description:    "Your proposed upload exceeds the maximum allowed object size.",
		HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
	},
	ErrExcessData: {
		Code:           "ExcessData",
		Description:    "More data provided than indicated content length",

    /** The size of the preload buffer for checking file format. */
    protected int preloadSize = 512;

    /** Enable validation of sitemap entries. */
    protected boolean enableValidation = false;

    /** Maximum URL length according to sitemap specification. */
    protected static final int MAX_URL_LENGTH = 2048;

    /** Valid changefreq values. */