assertEquals("0A0B0C", Hexdump.toHexString(data3, 0, 6)); // 6 chars = 3 bytes

        // Test with offset - NOTE: srcIndex is ignored due to bug, it always starts from index 0
        byte[] data4 = { 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44 };
        assertEquals("00", Hexdump.toHexString(data4, 1, 2)); // Bug: ignores srcIndex, reads from 0

import org.jspecify.annotations.Nullable;

/**
 * An object that converts literal text into a format safe for inclusion in a particular context
 * (such as an XML document). Typically (but not always), the inverse process of "unescaping" the
 * text is performed automatically by the relevant parser.
 *
 * <p>For example, an XML escaper would convert the literal string {@code "Foo<Bar>"} into {@code

   * b, c}}.
   *
   * @param arrays zero or more {@code boolean} arrays
   * @return a single array containing all the values from the source arrays, in order
   * @throws IllegalArgumentException if the total number of elements in {@code arrays} does not fit
   *     in an {@code int}
   */
  public static boolean[] concat(boolean[]... arrays) {
    long length = 0;
    for (boolean[] array : arrays) {

   * b, c}}.
   *
   * @param arrays zero or more {@code boolean} arrays
   * @return a single array containing all the values from the source arrays, in order
   * @throws IllegalArgumentException if the total number of elements in {@code arrays} does not fit
   *     in an {@code int}
   */
  public static boolean[] concat(boolean[]... arrays) {
    long length = 0;
    for (boolean[] array : arrays) {

		f.NonUTF8 = false
	default:
		// Might be UTF-8, might be some other encoding; preserve existing flag.
		// Some ZIP writers use UTF-8 encoding without setting the UTF-8 flag.
		// Since it is impossible to always distinguish valid UTF-8 from some
		// other encoding (e.g., GBK or Shift-JIS), we trust the flag.
		f.NonUTF8 = f.Flags&0x800 == 0
	}

	needUSize := f.UncompressedSize == ^uint32(0)

// One 16 MiB is a reasonable max limit.
//
// Then we read the signature and payload data. We compute the SHA256 checksum
// of the payload and verify that it matches the expected signature value.
//
// The last chunk is *always* 0-sized. So, we must only return io.EOF if we have encountered
// a chunk with a chunk size = 0. However, this chunk still has a signature and we must
// verify it.
const maxChunkSize = 16 << 20 // 16 MiB

/// tip

Review what each line does by clicking each number bubble in the code. 👆

///

/// warning

Make sure to **always** use the **exec form** of the `CMD` instruction, as explained below.

///

#### Use `CMD` - Exec Form { #use-cmd-exec-form }

			ReplicationDeleteMarker: dobj.DeleteMarkerVersionID != "",
			ReplicationMTime:        dobj.DeleteMarkerMTime.Time,
			ReplicationStatus:       minio.ReplicationStatusReplica,
			ReplicationRequest:      true, // always set this to distinguish between `mc mirror` replication and serverside
		},
	})
	if rmErr != nil {
		rinfo.Err = rmErr
		if dobj.VersionID == "" {
			rinfo.ReplicationStatus = replication.Failed
		} else {

			healingLogIf(ctx, errors.New("all drives are in healing state, aborting.."))
			return nil
		}

		disks = disks[:len(disks)-healing] // healing drives are always at the end of the list

		if len(disks) < er.setDriveCount/2 {
			return fmt.Errorf("not enough drives (found=%d, healing=%d, total=%d) are available to heal `%s`", len(disks), healing, er.setDriveCount, tracker.disk.String())

Each interceptor chain has relative merits.

**Application interceptors**

 * Don't need to worry about intermediate responses like redirects and retries.
 * Are always invoked once, even if the HTTP response is served from the cache.
 * Observe the application's original intent. Unconcerned with OkHttp-injected headers like `If-None-Match`.