// Programmed errors: API call number => error to return
	errors map[int]error
	// The error to return when no error value is programmed
	defaultErr error
	// The current API call number
	callNR int
	// Data protection
	mu sync.Mutex
}

func newNaughtyDisk(d StorageAPI, errs map[int]error, defaultErr error) *naughtyDisk {
	return &naughtyDisk{disk: d, errors: errs, defaultErr: defaultErr}
}

 *
 * Features:
 * - Encrypts credentials at rest using AES-256-GCM
 * - Uses PBKDF2 for key derivation from master password
 * - Secure wiping of sensitive data
 * - Thread-safe operations
 * - Protection against timing attacks
 */
public class SecureCredentialStorage implements AutoCloseable, Destroyable {

    private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(SecureCredentialStorage.class);

import jcifs.CIFSException;
import jcifs.internal.smb2.nego.PreauthIntegrityNegotiateContext;

/**
 * Enhanced Pre-Authentication Integrity Service for SMB 3.1.1.
 *
 * Provides comprehensive pre-authentication integrity protection against
 * downgrade attacks by maintaining cryptographic hash chains of all
 * negotiation and session setup messages.
 */
public class PreauthIntegrityService {

        int written = request.writeBytesWireFormat(buffer, 0);

        assertEquals(24, written);
        assertEquals(24, SMBUtil.readInt2(buffer, 0));
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test buffer overflow protection")
    void testBufferOverflowProtection() {
        byte[] smallBuffer = new byte[23]; // One byte too small

        // Should throw ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException

    }

    /**
     * We attempt to detect deliberate hash flooding attempts. If one is detected, we fall back to a
     * wrapper around j.u.HashSet, which has built-in flooding protection. MAX_RUN_MULTIPLIER was
     * determined experimentally to match our desired probability of false positives.
     */
    // NB: yes, this is surprisingly high, but that's what the experiments said was necessary

    } catch (BucketOverflowException e) {
      // probable hash flooding attack, fall back to j.u.HM based implementation and use its
      // implementation of hash flooding protection
      return JdkBackedImmutableMap.create(n, entryArray, throwIfDuplicateKeys);
    }
  }

  private static <K, V> ImmutableMap<K, V> fromEntryArrayCheckingBucketOverflow(

            buf.setIndex(0);
            this.securityProvider.wrap(buf);
        }
        return buf;
    }

    /**
     * Sets the DCERPC security provider for authentication and message protection
     * @param securityProvider the security provider to use for DCERPC authentication
     */
    public void setDcerpcSecurityProvider(final DcerpcSecurityProvider securityProvider) {

        int written = request.writeBytesWireFormat(buffer, 0);

        assertEquals(24, written);
        assertEquals(24, SMBUtil.readInt2(buffer, 0));
    }

    @Test
    @DisplayName("Test buffer overflow protection")
    void testBufferOverflowProtection() {
        byte[] smallBuffer = new byte[23]; // One byte too small

        // Should throw ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException

            // Verify structure integrity with maximum values
            assertEquals(49, SMBUtil.readInt2(buffer, 0));
        }

        @Test
        @DisplayName("Should handle buffer overflow protection")
        void testBufferOverflowProtection() {
            request.setReadLength(65536);

            byte[] smallBuffer = new byte[48]; // Smaller than required 49 bytes

   * locally.
   *
   * @since 24.1
   */
  public static final String X_DOWNLOAD_OPTIONS = "X-Download-Options";

  /** The HTTP {@code X-XSS-Protection} header field name. */
  public static final String X_XSS_PROTECTION = "X-XSS-Protection";

  /**
   * The HTTP <a
   * href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-DNS-Prefetch-Control">{@code