* for information on the behaviour of the algorithm.
 *
 * <p>On Intel Core2 2.66, on 1000 bytes, fingerprint2011 takes 0.9 microseconds compared to
 * fingerprint at 4.0 microseconds and md5 at 4.5 microseconds.
 *
 * <p>Note to maintainers: This implementation relies on signed arithmetic being bit-wise equivalent
 * to unsigned arithmetic in all cases except:
 *

    }

    @Override
    public int hashCode() {
        return rank;
    }

    @Override
    public String toString() {
        return key;
    }

    @Override
    public int compareTo(ArtifactStatus s) {
        return rank - s.rank;
    }

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                        if (e2.getPomOrder() == e1.getPomOrder()) {
                            return e1.getTarget()
                                    .toString()
                                    .compareTo(e2.getTarget().toString());
                        }
                        return e2.getPomOrder() - e1.getPomOrder();
                    }
                    return e2.getDepth() - e1.getDepth();

    <T> void set(@Nonnull Key<T> key, @Nullable T value);

    /**
     * Associates the specified session data with the given key if the key is currently mapped to the given value. This
     * method provides an atomic compare-and-update of some key's value.
     *
     * @param key the key under which to store the session data, must not be {@code null}
     * @param oldValue the expected data currently associated with the key, may be {@code null}

  public void testCompare() {
    for (char x : VALUES) {
      for (char y : VALUES) {
        assertWithMessage(x + ", " + y)
            .that(Math.signum(Chars.compare(x, y)))
            .isEqualTo(Math.signum(Character.compare(x, y)));
      }
    }
  }

  public void testContains() {
    assertThat(Chars.contains(EMPTY, (char) 1)).isFalse();
    assertThat(Chars.contains(ARRAY1, (char) 2)).isFalse();

         * Android), the built-in TypeVariable's equals() method doesn't recognize instances of our
         * TypeVariable implementation. This is a problem because users compare TypeVariables from
         * the JDK against TypeVariables returned by TypeResolver. To work with all JDK versions,
         * TypeResolver must return the appropriate TypeVariable implementation in each of the three

			return errFileCorrupt
		}
		return nil
	}

	h := algo.New()
	hashBuf := make([]byte, h.Size())
	left := wantSize

	// Calculate the size of the bitrot file and compare
	// it with the actual file size.
	if left != bitrotShardFileSize(partSize, shardSize, algo) {
		return errFileCorrupt
	}

	bufp := xioutil.ODirectPoolSmall.Get()
	defer xioutil.ODirectPoolSmall.Put(bufp)

    if (roundArbitrarilyAsLong == Long.MAX_VALUE) {
      /*
       * For most values, the conversion from roundArbitrarily to roundArbitrarilyAsLong is
       * lossless. In that case we can compare x to roundArbitrarily using Long.compare(x,
       * roundArbitrarilyAsLong). The exception is for values where the conversion to double rounds
       * up to give roundArbitrarily equal to 2^63, so the conversion back to long overflows and

 * "The .NET Developer's Guide to Windows Security" (which is also
 * available online).
 * <p>
 * Direct ACEs are evaluated first in order. The SID of the user performing
 * the operation and the desired access bits are compared to the SID
 * and access mask of each ACE. If the SID matches, the allow/deny flags
 * and access mask are considered. If the ACE is a "deny"
 * ACE and <i>any</i> of the desired access bits match bits in the access