}
        }
        final HttpServletResponse response = LaResponseUtil.getResponse();
        if (t instanceof final InvalidAccessTokenException e) {
            response.setHeader("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer error=\"" + e.getType() + "\"");
            writeJsonResponse(HttpServletResponse.SC_UNAUTHORIZED, message);
        } else {
            writeJsonResponse(status, message);
        }
    }

* kube-apiserver: the OpenID Connect authenticator can now verify ID Tokens signed with JOSE algorithms other than RS256 through the --oidc-signing-algs flag. ([#58544](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/58544), [@ericchiang](https://github.com/ericchiang))

few seconds. ([#50258](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/50258), [@liggitt](https://github.com/liggitt))

* The OpenID Connect authenticator can now use a custom prefix, or omit the default prefix, for username and groups claims through the --oidc-username-prefix and --oidc-groups-prefix flags. For example, the authenticator can map a user with the username "jane" to "google:jane" by supplying the "google:" username prefix. ([#50875](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/50875),...

  fun authenticatingTunnelProxyConnect() {
    enableTlsWithTunnel()
    server.enqueue(
      MockResponse
        .Builder()
        .inTunnel()
        .code(407)
        .addHeader("Proxy-Authenticate: Basic realm=\"localhost\"")
        .addHeader("Connection: close")
        .build(),
    )
    server.enqueue(
      MockResponse
        .Builder()
        .inTunnel()
        .build(),

		}
	}
}

func (s *peerRESTServer) writeErrorResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
	w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
	w.Write([]byte(err.Error()))
}

// IsValid - To authenticate and verify the time difference.
func (s *peerRESTServer) IsValid(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) bool {
	if err := storageServerRequestValidate(r); err != nil {
		s.writeErrorResponse(w, err)
		return false

- kube-apiserver:

invalid buffer overlap of output and additional data") } fips140.RecordApproved() if err := open(out, g, nonce, ciphertext, data); err != nil { // We sometimes decrypt and authenticate concurrently, so we overwrite // dst in the event of a tag mismatch. To be consistent across platforms // and to avoid releasing unauthenticated plaintext, we clear the buffer // in the event of an error. clear(out) return nil, err } return ret, nil } // sliceForAppend takes a slice and a requested number of bytes....

                     * is like changing the rug out from underneath our feet.
                     */
                    /* Technically we should also try to authenticate here but that means doing the session setup and tree connect separately. For now a simple connect will at least tell us if the host is alive. That should be sufficient for 99% of the cases. We can revisit this again for 2.0.

- Increased `CSINodeIDMaxLength` from 128 bytes to 192 bytes. ([#98753](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/98753), [@Jiawei0227](https://github.com/Jiawei0227))
- Kube-apiserver: The OIDC authenticator no longer waits 10 seconds before attempting to fetch the metadata required to verify tokens. ([#97693](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/97693), [@enj](https://github.com/enj)) [SIG API Machinery and Auth]

  EXPECT_EQ(TF_PERMISSION_DENIED,
            static_cast<TF_Code>(tensorflow::error::PERMISSION_DENIED));
  EXPECT_EQ(TF_UNAUTHENTICATED,
            static_cast<TF_Code>(tensorflow::error::UNAUTHENTICATED));
  EXPECT_EQ(TF_RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED,
            static_cast<TF_Code>(tensorflow::error::RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED));
  EXPECT_EQ(TF_FAILED_PRECONDITION,