String url, type;
        int n;

        try (SmbFileInputStream in = new SmbFileInputStream(file);
                ServletOutputStream out = resp.getOutputStream()) {
            url = file.getPath();

            resp.setContentType( "text/plain" );

            if(( n = url.lastIndexOf( '.' )) > 0 &&
                    ( type = url.substring( n + 1 )) != null &&

            throw problems.newModelBuildingException();
        }

        if (modelSource instanceof FileModelSource) {
            model = model.withPomFile(((FileModelSource) modelSource).getPath());
        }

        Model retModel = new Model(model);

        problems.setSource(retModel);

        modelValidator.validateFileModel(retModel, request, problems);

    try {
      return new File(url.toURI()); // Accepts escaped characters like %20.
    } catch (URISyntaxException e) { // URL.toURI() doesn't escape chars.
      return new File(url.getPath()); // Accepts non-escaped chars like space.
    }
  }

        return null;
    }

    /**
     * インデックスで指定された位置に値を設定します。
     *
     * @param index
     *            インデックス
     * @param value
     *            値
     */
    public void setAt(final int index, final V value) {
        getEntryAt(index).setValue(value);
    }

    @Override
    public V remove(final Object key) {
        final Entry<K, V> e = removeMap(key);
        if (e != null) {

            }
        }

        dataMap = processAdditionalData(dataMap, responseData, document);
        normalizeData(responseData, dataMap);

        try {
            resultData.setData(SerializeUtil.fromObjectToBinary(dataMap));
        } catch (final Exception e) {
            throw new CrawlingAccessException("Could not serialize object: " + responseData.getUrl(), e);
        }

 *
 * ```java
 * String attack = "http://example.com/static/images/../../../../../etc/passwd";
 * System.out.println(new URL(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(new URI(attack).getPath());
 * System.out.println(HttpUrl.parse(attack).encodedPath());
 * ```
 *
 * By canonicalizing the input paths, they are complicit in directory traversal attacks. Code that

      //      worrying about a symlink.
      return null;
    } else {
      // "foo" (working dir)
      return path.getFileSystem().getPath(".");
    }
  }

  /** Checks that the given options allow an insecure delete, throwing an exception if not. */
  private static void checkAllowsInsecure(Path path, RecursiveDeleteOption[] options)

      //      worrying about a symlink.
      return null;
    } else {
      // "foo" (working dir)
      return path.getFileSystem().getPath(".");
    }
  }

  /** Checks that the given options allow an insecure delete, throwing an exception if not. */
  private static void checkAllowsInsecure(Path path, RecursiveDeleteOption[] options)

        case NtStatus.NT_STATUS_PATH_NOT_COVERED:
            // samba fails to report the proper status for some operations
        case 0xC00000A2: // NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED
            checkReferral(resp, req.getPath(), req);
        case NtStatus.NT_STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW:
            break; /* normal for DCERPC named pipes */
        case NtStatus.NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED:
            break; /* normal for NTLMSSP */

pkg math/big, method (*Float) SetMantExp(*Float, int) *Float
pkg math/big, method (*Float) SetMode(RoundingMode) *Float
pkg math/big, method (*Float) SetPrec(uint) *Float
pkg math/big, method (*Float) SetRat(*Rat) *Float
pkg math/big, method (*Float) SetString(string) (*Float, bool)
pkg math/big, method (*Float) SetUint64(uint64) *Float
pkg math/big, method (*Float) Sign() int
pkg math/big, method (*Float) Signbit() bool