import static com.google.common.base.Preconditions.checkArgument;

import java.lang.reflect.Type;
import java.lang.reflect.TypeVariable;
import javax.annotation.CheckForNull;

/**
 * Captures a free type variable that can be used in {@link TypeToken#where}. For example:
 *
 * <pre>{@code
 * static <T> TypeToken<List<T>> listOf(Class<T> elementType) {
 *   return new TypeToken<List<T>>() {}
 *       .where(new TypeParameter<T>() {}, elementType);

 */
@GwtCompatible(emulated = true)
final class LenientSerializableTester {
  /*
   * TODO(cpovirk): move this to c.g.c.testing if we allow for c.g.c.annotations dependencies so
   * that it can be GWTified?
   */
  @CanIgnoreReturnValue
  @GwtIncompatible // SerializableTester
  static <E> Set<E> reserializeAndAssertLenient(Set<E> original) {
    Set<E> copy = reserialize(original);

    # put imports beginning with prefix after 3rd-party packages;
    # it's a comma-separated list of prefixes
    local-prefixes: istio.io/
issues:
  # Which dirs to exclude: issues from them won't be reported.
  # Can use regexp here: `generated.*`, regexp is applied on full path,
  # including the path prefix if one is set.
  # Default dirs are skipped independently of this option's value (see exclude-dirs-use-default).

    @InputFile
    public abstract RegularFileProperty getMetaDataFile();

    @OutputFile
    public abstract RegularFileProperty getMappingDestFile();

    /**
     * Package name can end with '.**' to exclude subpackages as well.
     */
    @Input
    public abstract SetProperty<String> getExcludedPackages();

    @TaskAction
    public void generate() throws IOException {

	redirectDNS := cfg.cfg.RedirectDNS
	if ingressMode && cfg.cfg.TPROXYRedirection {
		ingressMode = false
		// We could support this, but TPROXYRedirection is deprecated and will be removed soon, so we can just test less.
		log.Warnf("ignoring ingressMode due to TPROXYRedirection being enabled. These are mutually exclusive")
	}

	inpodMark := fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", InpodMark) + "/" + fmt.Sprintf("0x%x", InpodMask)

   *       implementation will effectively put the whole file in memory. On many systems with paging
   *       and virtual memory, this is not a problem - because it is mapped read-only, the kernel
   *       can always page it to disk "for free". However, on systems where killing processes
   *       happens all the time in normal conditions (i.e., android) the OS must make a tradeoff

* Use authorization to limit users' ability to use specific PodSecurityPolicy objects

**What is the impact?**

A user that is authorized to create pods can make use of any existing PodSecurityPolicy, even ones they are not authorized to use.

**How can I mitigate this prior to installing 1.5.5?**

1. Export existing PodSecurityPolicy objects:
  * `kubectl get podsecuritypolicies -o yaml > psp.yaml`

            properties:
              addresses:
                description: A list of IP address ranges over which MetalLB has authority.
                  You can list multiple ranges in a single pool, they will all share
                  the same settings. Each range can be either a CIDR prefix, or an
                  explicit start-end range of IPs.
                items:
                  type: string
                type: array

- Kubeadm: Added support during the preflight check "CreateJob" of "kubeadm upgrade" to check if there are no nodes where a Pod can be scheduled. If there are none, show a warning and skip this preflight check. This can happen in single node clusters where the only node was drained....

      }

      return mapGenerator.create(entries.toArray()).keySet();
    }

    @Override
    public K[] createArray(int length) {
      // TODO: with appropriate refactoring of OneSizeGenerator, we can perhaps
      // tidy this up and get rid of the casts here and in
      // MapValueCollectionGenerator.

      return ((TestMapGenerator<K, V>) mapGenerator.getInnerGenerator()).createKeyArray(length);
    }