*     .build();
 * client.newCall(request).execute();
 * ```
 *
 * As expected, this fails with a certificate pinning exception:
 *
 * ```java
 * javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException: Certificate pinning failure!
 * Peer certificate chain:
 *     sha256/afwiKY3RxoMmLkuRW1l7QsPZTJPwDS2pdDROQjXw8ig=: CN=publicobject.com, OU=PositiveSSL
 *     sha256/klO23nT2ehFDXCfx3eHTDRESMz3asj1muO+4aIdjiuY=: CN=COMODO RSA Secure Server CA

    /**
     * The key for the option to enable strict parsing. This option is of type {@link Boolean} and defaults to {@code
     * true}. If {@code false}, unknown elements will be ignored instead of causing a failure.
     */
    String IS_STRICT = "org.apache.maven.artifact.repository.metadata.io.isStrict";

    /**
     * Reads the metadata from the specified file.
     *

    /**
     * The key for the option to enable strict parsing. This option is of type {@link Boolean} and defaults to {@code
     * true}. If {@code false}, unknown elements will be ignored instead of causing a failure.
     */
    String IS_STRICT = "org.apache.maven.settings.io.isStrict";

    /**
     * Reads the settings from the specified file.
     *

    /**
     * The key for the option to enable strict parsing. This option is of type {@link Boolean} and defaults to {@code
     * true}. If {@code false}, unknown elements will be ignored instead of causing a failure.
     */
    String IS_STRICT = "org.apache.maven.toolchains.io.isStrict";

    /**
     * Reads the toolchains from the specified file.
     *

*   Fixes multiple `CHECK`-failures during Grappler's `IsSimplifiableReshape`
    ([CVE-2022-23581](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-23581))
*   Fixes multiple `CHECK`-failures during Grappler's `SafeToRemoveIdentity`
    ([CVE-2022-23579](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-23579))
*   Fixes multiple `CHECK`-failures in `TensorByteSize`

        for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
            if (signature[i] != data[offset + ServerMessageBlock.SIGNATURE_OFFSET + i]) {
                if( log.level >= 2 ) {
                    log.println( "signature verification failure" );
                    Hexdump.hexdump( log, signature, 0, 8 );
                    Hexdump.hexdump( log, data,
                        offset + ServerMessageBlock.SIGNATURE_OFFSET, 8 );
                }

            @Override
            public void onResponse(final SearchResponse searchResponse) {
                if (searchResponse.getFailedShards() > 0) {
                    deferred.reject(new SuggesterException("Search failure. Failed shards num:" + searchResponse.getFailedShards()));
                } else {
                    deferred.resolve(createResponse(searchResponse));
                }
            }

            @Override

	if algo != HighwayHash256S {
		h := algo.New()
		if n, err := io.Copy(h, r); err != nil || n != wantSize {
			// Premature failure in reading the object, file is corrupt.
			return errFileCorrupt
		}
		if !bytes.Equal(h.Sum(nil), want) {
			return errFileCorrupt
		}
		return nil
	}

	h := algo.New()

	// Call the ServeHTTP to execute the handler.
	apiRouter.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
	switch rec.Code {
	case http.StatusOK, http.StatusCreated, http.StatusAccepted, http.StatusNoContent:
		t.Fatalf("Test %v: expected failure, but succeeded with %v", instanceType, rec.Code)
	}

	// Verify response of the V2 signed HTTP request.
	// initialize HTTP NewRecorder, this records any mutations to response writer inside the handler.

| `minio_cluster_replication_proxied_head_requests_failures` | (_Site Replication Only_)Number of failures in HEAD requests proxied to replication target                          |