* @return The deserialized metadata, never {@code null}.
     * @throws IOException If the metadata could not be deserialized.
     * @throws MetadataParseException If the input format could not be parsed.
     */
    Metadata read(File input, Map<String, ?> options) throws IOException, MetadataParseException;

    /**

     * @return The deserialized settings, never {@code null}.
     * @throws IOException If the settings could not be deserialized.
     * @throws SettingsParseException If the input format could not be parsed.
     */
    Settings read(File input, Map<String, ?> options) throws IOException, SettingsParseException;

    /**

     * @return The deserialized toolchains, never {@code null}.
     * @throws IOException If the toolchains could not be deserialized.
     * @throws ToolchainsParseException If the input format could not be parsed.
     */
    PersistedToolchains read(File input, Map<String, ?> options) throws IOException, ToolchainsParseException;

    /**

#### A "professional" attack { #a-professional-attack }

Of course, the attackers would not try all this by hand, they would write a program to do it, possibly with thousands or millions of tests per second. And they would get just one extra correct letter at a time.

But doing that, in some minutes or hours the attackers would have guessed the correct username and password, with the "help" of our application, just using the time taken to answer.

     */
    @Nonnull
    SettingsBuilderResult build(@Nonnull SettingsBuilderRequest request);

    /**
     * Builds the effective settings of the specified settings sources.
     *
     * @return the result of the settings building, never {@code null}
     * @throws SettingsBuilderException if the effective settings could not be built
     */
    @Nonnull

If there's a security flaw in your code, it will still exist.

Hiding the documentation just makes it more difficult to understand how to interact with your API, and could make it more difficult for you to debug it in production. It could be considered simply a form of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity" class="external-link" target="_blank">Security through obscurity</a>.

MinIO versioning is designed to keep multiple versions of an object in one bucket. For example, you could store `spark.csv` (version `ede336f2`) and `spark.csv` (version `fae684da`) in a single bucket. Versioning protects you from unintended overwrites, deletions, protect objects with retention policies.

  //    (hypothetical) unsafe read by our caller. Note: adding 'volatile' does not fix this issue,
  //    it would just add an edge such that if done() observed non-null, then it would also
  //    definitely observe all earlier writes, but we still have no guarantee that done() would see
  //    the initial write (just stronger guarantees if it does).
  //

  // in the short hash. We saw that a mask of 0x7f would keep the 7-bit value 0x6f from a full
  // hashcode of 0x89abcdef. The imaginary `hash` value would then be the remaining top 25 bits,
  // 0x89abcd80. To this is added (or'd) the `next` value, which is an index within `entries`
  // (and therefore within `keys` and `values`) of another entry that has the same short hash

   * old Android Ice Cream Sandwich release), then this method throws an exception instead of
   * creating a directory that would be more accessible. (This behavior is new in Guava 32.0.0.
   * Previous versions would create a directory that is more accessible, as discussed in <a
   * href="https://github.com/google/guava/issues/4011">CVE-2020-8908</a>.)
   *