}

    private static final long serialVersionUID = 0;
  }

  /**
   * Parses the specified string as a signed decimal integer value. The ASCII character {@code '-'}
   * (<code>'&#92;u002D'</code>) is recognized as the minus sign.
   *
   * <p>Unlike {@link Integer#parseInt(String)}, this method returns {@code null} instead of

          signalledCallback = true
          responseCallback.onResponse(this@RealCall, response)
        } catch (e: IOException) {
          if (signalledCallback) {
            // Do not signal the callback twice!
            Platform.get().log("Callback failure for ${toLoggableString()}", Platform.INFO, e)
          } else {
            responseCallback.onFailure(this@RealCall, e)
          }

   * @return the greatest value less than {@code value}, or {@code null} if {@code value} is {@code
   *     minValue()}
   */
  @CheckForNull
  public abstract C previous(C value);

  /**
   * Returns a signed value indicating how many nested invocations of {@link #next} (if positive) or
   * {@link #previous} (if negative) are needed to reach {@code end} starting from {@code start}.

            labelIndex,
          )
        if (rule != null) {
          exception = rule
          break
        }
      }
    }

    if (exception != null) {
      // Signal we've identified an exception rule.
      exception = "!$exception"
      return exception.split('.')
    } else if (exactMatch == null && wildcardMatch == null) {
      return PREVAILING_RULE
    }

		b.uint16(h.ModifiedDate)
		b.uint32(h.CRC32)
		if h.isZip64() || h.offset >= uint32max {
			// the file needs a zip64 header. store maxint in both
			// 32 bit size fields (and offset later) to signal that the
			// zip64 extra header should be used.
			b.uint32(uint32max) // compressed size
			b.uint32(uint32max) // uncompressed size

			// append a zip64 extra block to Extra

				t.Errorf("Test %d: Parsed Signature field mismatch: Expected \"%s\", got \"%s\"", i+1, testCase.expectedAuthField.Signature, parsedAuthField.Signature)
			}

			// validating the extracted signed headers.
			if strings.Join(testCase.expectedAuthField.SignedHeaders, ",") != strings.Join(parsedAuthField.SignedHeaders, ",") {

	if payload != req.Header.Get(xhttp.AmzContentSha256) {
		return cred, "", "", time.Time{}, ErrContentSHA256Mismatch
	}

	// Extract all the signed headers along with its values.
	extractedSignedHeaders, errCode := extractSignedHeaders(signV4Values.SignedHeaders, r)
	if errCode != ErrNone {
		return cred, "", "", time.Time{}, errCode
	}

  }

  fun readLong(): Long {
    if (bytesLeft !in 1..8) throw ProtocolException("unexpected length: $bytesLeft at $this")

    var result = source.readByte().toLong() // No "and 0xff" because this is a signed value!
    while (byteCount < limit) {
      result = result shl 8
      result += source.readByte().toInt() and 0xff
    }
    return result
  }

  fun readBitString(): BitString {

certificate authority attacks such as the [2011 DigiNotar attack](https://www.computerworld.com/article/2510951/cybercrime-hacking/hackers-spied-on-300-000-iranians-using-fake-google-certificate.html). It also assumes your HTTPS servers’ certificates are signed by a certificate authority.

Use [CertificatePinner](https://square.github.io/okhttp/4.x/okhttp/okhttp3/-certificate-pinner/) to restrict which certificates and certificate authorities are trusted. Certificate pinning increases security, but...

				"X-Amz-Content-Sha256": payloadSHA256,
			},
			region:   "us-west-1",
			expected: ErrUnsignedHeaders,
		},
		// (3) Should fail to extract headers if the host header is not signed.
		{
			queryParams: map[string]string{
				"X-Amz-Algorithm":      signV4Algorithm,
				"X-Amz-Date":           now.Format(iso8601Format),
				"X-Amz-Expires":        "60",