### Hardware attacks

Physical GPUs or TPUs can also be the target of attacks. [Published
research](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=gpu+side+channel) shows that it
might be possible to use side channel attacks on the GPU to leak data from other
running models or processes in the same system. GPUs can also have
implementation bugs that might allow attackers to leave malicious code running

	 * 
	 * typedef struct _SID {
	 *    UCHAR Revision;
	 *    UCHAR SubAuthorityCount;
	 *    SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY IdentifierAuthority;
	 *    [size_is(SubAuthorityCount)] ULONG SubAuthority[*];
	 * } SID, *PSID;
	 */

	typedef struct {
		uint8_t revision;
		uint8_t sub_authority_count;
		uint8_t identifier_authority[6];
		[size_is(sub_authority_count)] uint32_t sub_authority[*];
	} sid_t;

	 * 
	 * typedef struct _SID {
	 *    UCHAR Revision;
	 *    UCHAR SubAuthorityCount;
	 *    SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY IdentifierAuthority;
	 *    [size_is(SubAuthorityCount)] ULONG SubAuthority[*];
	 * } SID, *PSID;
	 */

	typedef struct {
		uint8_t revision;
		uint8_t sub_authority_count;
		uint8_t identifier_authority[6];
		[size_is(sub_authority_count)] uint32_t sub_authority[*];
	} sid_t;

  // SideEffects states whether this webhook has side effects.
  // Acceptable values are: None, NoneOnDryRun (webhooks created via v1beta1 may also specify Some or Unknown).
  // Webhooks with side effects MUST implement a reconciliation system, since a request may be
  // rejected by a future step in the admission chain and the side effects therefore need to be undone.

          fi
          docker container prune -f
      - name: Clean repository
        shell: bash
        run: find /home/ubuntu/actions-runner/_work/tensorflow/tensorflow/. -name . -o -prune -exec sudo rm -rf -- {} + || true
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
      - name: Build binary and run python tests
        shell: bash
        run: |

if [ ! -f ./kes ]; then
	wget --quiet -O kes https://github.com/minio/kes/releases/latest/download/kes-linux-amd64 &&
		chmod +x kes
fi

if ! openssl version &>/dev/null; then
	apt install openssl || sudo apt install opensssl
fi

# Start KES Server
(./kes server --dev 2>&1 >kes-server.log) &
kes_pid=$!
sleep 5s
API_KEY=$(grep "API Key" <kes-server.log | awk -F" " '{print $3}')

   * class documentation above). This method is <i>generally expected</i>, but not absolutely
   * required, to have the following properties:
   *
   * <ul>
   *   <li>Its execution does not cause any observable side effects.
   *   <li>The computation is <i>consistent with equals</i>; that is, {@link Objects#equal
   *       Objects.equal}{@code (a, b)} implies that {@code predicate.apply(a) ==
   *       predicate.apply(b))}.
   * </ul>

		cat "/tmp/${site}_1.log"
		echo "==========================="
		cat "/tmp/${site}_2.log"
	done

	exit 1
}

cleanup() {
	echo -n "Cleaning up instances of MinIO ..."
	pkill -9 minio || sudo pkill -9 minio
	rm -rf /tmp/sitea
	rm -rf /tmp/siteb
	echo "done"
}

cleanup

export MINIO_CI_CD=1
export MINIO_BROWSER=off

make install-race

# Start MinIO instances

	ErrInvalidEncryptionMethod: {
		Code:           "InvalidArgument",
		Description:    "Server Side Encryption with AWS KMS managed key requires HTTP header x-amz-server-side-encryption : aws:kms",
		HTTPStatusCode: http.StatusBadRequest,
	},
	ErrIncompatibleEncryptionMethod: {
		Code:           "InvalidArgument",
		Description:    "Server Side Encryption with Customer provided key is incompatible with the encryption method specified",

        "admin:CreateUser",
        "admin:DeleteUser",
        "admin:ConfigUpdate"
      ],
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Sid": ""
    },
    {
      "Action": [
        "s3:*"
      ],
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Resource": [
        "arn:aws:s3:::*"
      ],
      "Sid": ""
    }
  ]
}
EOF
```

Create new canned policy by name `userManager` using `userManager.json` policy file.

```