assertSip("abcdef", 0x2a6e77e733c7c05dL);
    assertSip("SipHash", 0x8325093242a96f60L);
  }

  // Test for common pitfall regarding sign extension.
  // For example: (long) data[i++] | (long) data[i++] << 8 | ...
  // If data[i] == (byte) 0x80, the first cast will sign-extend it to 0xffffffffffffff80,
  // masking the remaining seven bytes.
  // To test this, we give an input where bit 7 is not cleared. For example:

    assertSip("abcdef", 0x2a6e77e733c7c05dL);
    assertSip("SipHash", 0x8325093242a96f60L);
  }

  // Test for common pitfall regarding sign extension.
  // For example: (long) data[i++] | (long) data[i++] << 8 | ...
  // If data[i] == (byte) 0x80, the first cast will sign-extend it to 0xffffffffffffff80,
  // masking the remaining seven bytes.
  // To test this, we give an input where bit 7 is not cleared. For example:

              <version>3.0.1</version>
              <executions>
                <execution>
                  <id>sign-artifacts</id>
                  <phase>verify</phase>
                  <goals>
                    <goal>sign</goal>
                  </goals>
                </execution>
              </executions>
            </plugin>
          </plugins>
      </build>

  }

  /*
   * To avoid the need to call requireNonNull so much, we could consider more clever approaches,
   * such as:
   *
   * - Make checkOpen return the non-null `seq`. Then callers can assign that to a local variable or
   *   even back to `this.seq`. However, that may suggest that we're defending against concurrent
   *   mutation, which is not an actual risk because we use `synchronized`.

  }

  /*
   * To avoid the need to call requireNonNull so much, we could consider more clever approaches,
   * such as:
   *
   * - Make checkOpen return the non-null `seq`. Then callers can assign that to a local variable or
   *   even back to `this.seq`. However, that may suggest that we're defending against concurrent
   *   mutation, which is not an actual risk because we use `synchronized`.

# Disable sign-off checking for members of the Gradle GitHub organization
require:

tasks.withType<Sign>().configureEach { isEnabled = signArtifacts }

signing {
    useInMemoryPgpKeys(
        project.providers.environmentVariable("PGP_SIGNING_KEY").orNull,
        project.providers.environmentVariable("PGP_SIGNING_KEY_PASSPHRASE").orNull
    )
    publishing.publications.configureEach {
        if (signArtifacts) {
            signing.sign(this)
        }
    }
}

If you didn't sign off your commits before creating the pull request, you can fix that after the fact.

To sign off a single commit:

`git commit --amend --signoff`

To sign off one or multiple commits:

`git rebase --signoff origin/master`

Then force push your branch:

contained in this repository.

If you believe you have discovered a security vulnerability, please follow the
guidelines at https://bugcrowd.com/squareopensource


## Verifying Artifacts

We sign our artifacts using this [key][signing_key]:

```
pub rsa4096/dbd744ace7ade6aa50dd591f66b50994442d2d40 2021-07-09T14:50:19Z
	 Hash=a79b48fd6a1f31699c788b50c97d0b98

uid Square Clippy <******@****.***>

Before your code can be accepted into the project you must also sign the
[Individual Contributor License Agreement (CLA)][1].