import javax.net.ssl.SSLPeerUnverifiedException
import javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager
import okhttp3.internal.platform.Platform

/**
 * Computes the effective certificate chain from the raw array returned by Java's built in TLS APIs.
 * Cleaning a chain returns a list of certificates where the first element is `chain[0]`, each
 * certificate is signed by the certificate that follows, and the last certificate is a trusted CA
 * certificate.
 *

      }
    }
    for (String value : values) {
      builder.put(normalizedAttribute, normalizeParameterValue(normalizedAttribute, value));
    }
    MediaType mediaType = new MediaType(type, subtype, builder.build());
    // if the attribute isn't charset, we can just inherit the current parsedCharset
    if (!normalizedAttribute.equals(CHARSET_ATTRIBUTE)) {
      mediaType.parsedCharset = this.parsedCharset;
    }

        HANDLE.set(array, offset, value);
      }
    };

    @Override
    public boolean usesFastPath() {
      return true;
    }

    /*
     * non-private so that our `-source 8` build doesn't need to generate a synthetic accessor
     * method, whose mention of VarHandle would upset WriteReplaceOverridesTest under Java 8.
     */

# Simple OAuth2 with Password and Bearer { #simple-oauth2-with-password-and-bearer }

Now let's build from the previous chapter and add the missing parts to have a complete security flow.

## Get the `username` and `password` { #get-the-username-and-password }

We are going to use **FastAPI** security utilities to get the `username` and `password`.

		for p := range latestMeta.Parts {
			if verifyErr != nil {
				dataErrsByPart[p][i] = convPartErrToInt(verifyErr)
			} else {
				dataErrsByPart[p][i] = verifyResp.Results[p]
			}
		}
	}

	// Build dataErrs by disk from dataErrs by part
	for part, disks := range dataErrsByPart {
		for disk := range disks {
			dataErrsByDisk[disk][part] = dataErrsByPart[part][disk]
		}
	}
	return

variables from your model are also going to be untrusted. That means that if
your code interacts with the filesystem, network, etc. and uses checkpointed
variables as part of those interactions (ex: using a string variable to build a
filesystem path), a maliciously created checkpoint might be able to change the
targets of those operations, which could result in arbitrary
read/write/executions.

### Running a TensorFlow server

 * <p>
 * Scopes define the lifecycle and visibility of objects in the dependency injection
 * system. Custom scope annotations should be annotated with {@code @Scope}.
 * <p>
 * Built-in scopes include:
 * <ul>
 *   <li>{@link Singleton} - One instance per container</li>
 *   <li>{@link SessionScoped} - One instance per Maven session</li>

    val socket = peer.openSocket()
    val connection =
      Http2Connection
        .Builder(true, TaskRunner.INSTANCE)
        .socket(socket.asBufferedSocket(), "peer")
        .pushObserver(IGNORE)
        .build()
    connection.start(sendConnectionPreface = false)
    socket.shutdownOutput()
    assertFailsWith<IOException> {
      connection.newStream(headerEntries("a", longString), false)
    }

                    ),
                )
            }
            if (specificBuildTypes.size > 1) {
                buildType(
                    PartialTrigger(
                        "All Specific Builds for ${stage.stageName.stageName}",
                        "Stage_${stage.stageName.id}_SpecificBuilds",
                        model,
                        specificBuildTypes,
                    ),
                )

   * AtomicReferenceFieldUpdater.newUpdater inside *AtomicHelper "should" have access to
   * AbstractFutureState's private fields. However, our open-source build uses `-source 8 -target
   * 8`, so the class files from that build can't express nestmates. Thus, when those class files
   * are used from Java 9 or higher (i.e., high enough to trigger the VarHandle code path), such a