TF_DeleteBuffer(graph_def);

  // Can add nodes to the imported graph without trouble.
  Add(feed, scalar, graph, s);
  ASSERT_EQ(TF_OK, TF_GetCode(s)) << TF_Message(s);

  TF_DeleteGraph(graph);
  TF_DeleteStatus(s);
}

TEST(CAPI, ImportGraphDef_WithReturnOutputs) {
  TF_Status* s = TF_NewStatus();
  TF_Graph* graph = TF_NewGraph();

  // Create a graph with two nodes: x and 3
  Placeholder(graph, s);

	envValues := make(map[string]string, len(envs))
	for _, envK := range envs {
		// skip certain environment variables as part
		// of the whitelist and could be configured
		// differently on each nodes, update skipEnvs()
		// map if there are such environment values
		if _, ok := skipEnvs[envK]; ok {
			continue
		}
		envValues[envK] = logger.HashString(env.Get(envK, ""))
	}

  - [Changelog since v1.30.8](#changelog-since-v1308)
  - [Important Security Information](#important-security-information-1)
    - [CVE-2024-9042: Command Injection affecting Windows nodes via nodes/*/logs/query API](#cve-2024-9042-command-injection-affecting-windows-nodes-via-nodeslogsquery-api)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-5)
    - [API Change](#api-change)
    - [Feature](#feature-3)
    - [Bug or Regression](#bug-or-regression-4)

      currentWaiter.unpark();
    }
  }

  // Gets and Timed Gets
  //
  // * Be responsive to interruption
  // * Don't create Waiter nodes if you aren't going to park, this helps reduce contention on
  //   waitersField.
  // * Future completion is defined by when #valueField becomes non-null/non DelegatingToFuture

  - [Changelog since v1.29.12](#changelog-since-v12912)
  - [Important Security Information](#important-security-information)
    - [CVE-2024-9042: Command Injection affecting Windows nodes via nodes/*/logs/query API](#cve-2024-9042-command-injection-affecting-windows-nodes-via-nodeslogsquery-api)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-2)
    - [API Change](#api-change)
    - [Feature](#feature-1)
    - [Bug or Regression](#bug-or-regression)

    * `kubectl delete node/<nodeName>`
    * or grant self-deletion permission explicitly:
        * `kubectl create clusterrole self-deleting-nodes --verb=delete --resource=nodes`
        * `kubectl create clusterrolebinding self-deleting-nodes --clusterrole=self-deleting-nodes --group=system:nodes`

    - [CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3955-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
    - [CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3676-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-7)

more. While Kubernetes already validates the proxying address for Nodes, a bug in kube-apiserver made it possible to bypass this validation. Bypassing this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to be redirected to the API Server through its private network.

The merged fix enforces validation against the proxying address for a Node. In some cases, the fix can break clients that depend on the `nodes/proxy` subresource, specifically if a kubelet advertises a localhost...

      currentWaiter.unpark();
    }
  }

  // Gets and Timed Gets
  //
  // * Be responsive to interruption
  // * Don't create Waiter nodes if you aren't going to park, this helps reduce contention on
  //   waitersField.
  // * Future completion is defined by when #valueField becomes non-null/non DelegatingToFuture

    - [CVE-2023-3955: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3955-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
    - [CVE-2023-3676: Insufficient input sanitization on Windows nodes leads to privilege escalation](#cve-2023-3676-insufficient-input-sanitization-on-windows-nodes-leads-to-privilege-escalation)
  - [Changes by Kind](#changes-by-kind-14)