} catch (final MissingResourceException ignore) {
            return null;
        }
    }

    /**
     * Returns the string for the specified key from the resource bundle.
     *
     * @param bundle the resource bundle (must not be {@literal null} or empty)
     * @param key the key
     * @return the string for the specified key (must not be {@literal null} or empty)

     */
    public ProcessHelper() {
        // Default constructor
    }

    /**
     * Cleanup method called when the bean is destroyed.
     * Stops all running processes and cleans up resources.
     */
    @PreDestroy
    public void destroy() {
        for (final String sessionId : runningProcessMap.keySet()) {
            if (logger.isInfoEnabled()) {

 * imposes both obligations and limits on the client application.
 *
 * ### The response body must be closed.
 *
 * Each response body is backed by a limited resource like a socket (live network responses) or
 * an open file (for cached responses). Failing to close the response body will leak resources and
 * may ultimately cause the application to slow down or crash.
 *
 * Both this class and [Response] implement [Closeable]. Closing a response simply

# Resources { #resources }

* [fess_label_en.properties](https://github.com/codelibs/fess/blob/master/src/main/resources/fess_label_en.properties)
* [fess_message_en.properties](https://github.com/codelibs/fess/blob/master/src/main/resources/fess_message_en.properties)

     * Cluster-aware witness service for general cluster resources
     */
    CLUSTER_WITNESS,

    /**
     * Individual file server witness for standalone servers
     */
    FILE_SERVER_WITNESS,

    /**
     * Scale-out file server witness for scale-out deployments
     */
    SCALE_OUT_WITNESS,

    /**
     * DFS namespace witness for distributed file system resources
     */
    DFS_WITNESS

This release contains changes that address the following vulnerabilities:

### CVE-2022-3162: Unauthorized read of Custom Resources

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users authorized to list or watch one type of namespaced custom resource cluster-wide can read custom resources of a different type in the same API group they are not authorized to read.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.25.0 - v1.25.3

    /** Not listening for the calling name */
    public static final int NOT_LISTENING_CALLING = 0x81;
    /** Called name not present */
    public static final int CALLED_NOT_PRESENT = 0x82;
    /** Insufficient resources to establish session */
    public static final int NO_RESOURCES = 0x83;
    /** Unspecified session service error */
    public static final int UNSPECIFIED = 0x8F;

    /** The NetBIOS error class */

In diesem Fall könnte es besser sein, nur zwei Server zu haben und einen höheren Prozentsatz von deren Ressourcen zu nutzen (CPU, Arbeitsspeicher, Festplatte, Netzwerkbandbreite, usw.).

   * Otherwise, they are cross-site URLs.
   *
   * When a URL is requested, it may be in the context of another URL.
   *
   *  * **Embedded resources like images and iframes** in browsers use the context as the page in
   *    the address bar and the subject is the URL of an embedded resource.
   *
   *  * **Potentially-destructive navigations such as HTTP POST calls** use the context as the page