public int getType() {
            return LIST_ITEM;
        }

        @Override
        public boolean isNull() {
            return (size() == 0);
        }

        void normalize() {
            for (int i = size() - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
                Item lastItem = get(i);

                if (lastItem.isNull()) {
                    if (i == size() - 1 || get(i + 1).getType() == STRING_ITEM) {

        assertArgumentNotNull("pathToCheck", pathToCheck);
        assertArgumentNotNull("baseDirectory", baseDirectory);

        final Path normalizedPath = pathToCheck.toAbsolutePath().normalize();
        final Path normalizedBase = baseDirectory.toAbsolutePath().normalize();
        return normalizedPath.startsWith(normalizedBase);
    }

    /**
     * Validates that a given file is safe and does not attempt path traversal attacks.
     * <p>

        // file. Ideally, we'd do full pattern-evaluation against the sysprops, but this
        // is a first step. There are several replacements below, in order to normalize
        // the path character before we operate on the string as a regex input, and
        // in order to avoid surprises with the File construction...

        }

        // relative path, e.g. "sub", "../sub" or "."
        else if (reactorDirectory != null) {
            File selectedProject =
                    new File(new File(reactorDirectory, selector).toURI().normalize());

            if (selectedProject.isFile()) {
                return selectedProject.equals(project.getFile());
            } else if (selectedProject.isDirectory()) {

      return false
    }
    if (pattern.isNullOrEmpty() ||
      pattern.startsWith(".") ||
      pattern.endsWith("..")
    ) {
      // Invalid pattern.
      return false
    }

    // Normalize hostname and pattern by turning them into absolute domain names if they are not
    // yet absolute. This is needed because server certificates do not normally contain absolute

         *                 If null, the path string representation is used
         */
        protected PathSource(Path path, String location) {
            this.path = requireNonNull(path, "path").normalize();
            this.location = location != null ? location : this.path.toString();
        }

        @Override
        @Nullable
        public Path getPath() {
            return path;
        }

                sb.append(curChar);
            }
        }
        return sb.toString();
    }

    /**
     * Normalizes a permission name based on configuration settings.
     *
     * @param name the permission name to normalize
     * @return the normalized permission name
     */
    public String normalizePermissionName(final String name) {
        if (fessConfig.isLdapLowercasePermissionName()) {

    /**
     * PDF config file path.
     */
    public static final String TIKA_PDF_CONFIG = "tika.pdf.config";

    /**
     * A parameter key to normalize a text.
     */
    public static final String NORMALIZE_TEXT = "normalize_text";

    private static final String FILE_PASSWORD = "fess.file.password";

    /**
     * Output encoding.
     */

        if (StringUtil.isBlank(path)) {
            throw new IllegalArgumentException("File path cannot be empty");
        }
        try {
            final Path filePath = Paths.get(path).normalize();
            final String normalizedPath = filePath.toString();
            if (normalizedPath.contains("..")) {
                throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid file path");
            }

            dr.pathConsumed = consumed;

            /*
             * Samba has a tendency to return pathConsumed values so that they consume a trailing slash of the
             * requested path. Normalize this here.
             */
            if (reqPath.charAt(consumed - 1) == '\\') {
                if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
                    log.debug("Server consumed trailing slash of request path, adjusting");