}

  @SuppressWarnings("JUnitIncompatibleType")
  public void testWhere() {
    assertEquals(new TypeToken<Map<String, Integer>>() {}, mapOf(String.class, Integer.class));
    // Type inference is doomed here: int.class is the same as Integer.class, so this is comparing
    // TypeToken<int[]> and TypeToken<Integer[]>.
    assertEquals(new TypeToken<int[]>() {}, arrayOf(int.class));

  /*
   * The basic strategy is to subdivide the table among Segments, each of which itself is a
   * concurrently readable hash table. The map supports non-blocking reads and concurrent writes
   * across different segments.
   *
   * The page replacement algorithm's data structures are kept casually consistent with the map. The
   * ordering of writes to a segment is sequentially consistent. An update to the map and recording

([#64347](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/64347), [@neolit123](https://github.com/neolit123))

  /*
   * The basic strategy is to subdivide the table among Segments, each of which itself is a
   * concurrently readable hash table. The map supports non-blocking reads and concurrent writes
   * across different segments.
   *
   * The page replacement algorithm's data structures are kept casually consistent with the map. The
   * ordering of writes to a segment is sequentially consistent. An update to the map and recording

  CHECK(tensorflow::unwrap(concatOp)->OpDef());
  TFE_OpAddInput(concatOp, inputs[0], status);
  CHECK_EQ(TF_OK, TF_GetCode(status)) << TF_Message(status);
  EXPECT_FALSE(tensorflow::unwrap(concatOp)->OpDef())
      << "Inference context is still present";
  TFE_OpAddInput(concatOp, inputs[1], status);
  CHECK_EQ(TF_OK, TF_GetCode(status)) << TF_Message(status);

  tensorflow::AttrValueMap attr_values = ExtractAttrs(concatOp);

* kubectl now supports validation of nested objects with different ApiGroups (e.g. objects in a List) ([#25172](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/25172), [@pwittrock](https://github.com/pwittrock))

### Bug or Regression

- Fix a scheduler preemption issue where the victim pod was not deleted due to incorrect status patching. This issue occurred when the preemptor and victim pods had different QoS classes in their status, causing the preemption to fail entirely. ([#126694](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/126694), [@Huang-Wei](https://github.com/Huang-Wei)) [SIG Scheduling]

    assertFailsWith<IOException> {
      getResponse(newRequest("/foo"))
    }.also { expected ->
      when (expected) {
        is SSLHandshakeException -> {
          // Allow conscrypt to fail in different ways
          if (!platform.isConscrypt()) {
            assertThat(expected.cause!!).isInstanceOf<CertificateException>()
          }
        }
        is TlsFatalAlert -> {}
        else -> throw expected

		if err != nil {
			writeErrorResponse(ctx, w, toAPIError(ctx, err), r.URL)
			return
		}
	}

	// If src == dst and either
	// - the object is encrypted using SSE-C and two different SSE-C keys are present
	// - the object is encrypted using SSE-S3 and the SSE-S3 header is present
	// - the object storage class is not changing
	// then execute a key rotation.

* Azure file persistent volumes can use a new `secretNamespace` field to reference a secret in a different namespace than the one containing their bound persistent volume claim. The azure file persistent volume provisioner honors a corresponding `secretNamespace` storage class parameter to determine where to place secrets containing the storage account...