### CVE-2024-3177: Bypassing mountable secrets policy imposed by the ServiceAccount admission plugin

A security issue was discovered in Kubernetes where users may be able to launch containers that bypass the mountable secrets policy enforced by the ServiceAccount admission plugin when using containers, init containers, and ephemeral containers with the envFrom field populated.

**Affected Versions**:
  - kube-apiserver v1.29.0 - v1.29.3

Spark/Hadoop workloads which use Hadoop MR Committer v1/v2 algorithm upload objects to a temporary prefix in a bucket. These objects are 'renamed' to a different prefix on Job commit. Object storage admins are forced to configure separate ILM policies to expire these objects and their versions to reclaim space.

### Solution

   * returns the return value; or calls the underlying constructor with {@code args} and returns the
   * constructed instance.
   *
   * @throws IllegalAccessException if this {@code Constructor} object enforces Java language access
   *     control and the underlying method or constructor is inaccessible.
   * @throws IllegalArgumentException if the number of actual and formal parameters differ; if an

      }
      return ImmutableMap.copyOf(map);
    }

    @Override
    public void refresh(K key) {
      throw new UnsupportedOperationException();
    }
  }

  /**
   * LinkedHashMap that enforces it's maximum size and logs events in a StatsCounter object and an
   * optional RemovalListener.
   *
   * @param <K> the base key type
   * @param <V> the base value type
   */

   character including, without limitation, damages for lost profits, loss of
   goodwill, work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all
   other commercial damages or losses, even if such party shall have been
   informed of the possibility of such damages. This limitation of liability
   shall not apply to liability for death or personal injury resulting from such
   party’s negligence to the extent applicable law prohibits such limitation.

   * We get plan3 as a retry of plan0, which was canceled when it lost the race.
   *
   * This test confirms that we prefer to do the TLS follow-up (plan2) before the TCP retry (plan3).
   * It also confirms we enforce the 250 ms delay in each race.
   */
  @Test
  fun tcpConnectionsRaceAfterTlsFails() {
    val plan0 = routePlanner.addPlan()
    plan0.tcpConnectDelayNanos = 280.ms

    val plan1 = routePlanner.addPlan()

The `Union` in `Union[str, None]` will allow your editor to give you better support and detect errors.

///

## Additional validation

We are going to enforce that even though `q` is optional, whenever it is provided, **its length doesn't exceed 50 characters**.

### Import `Query` and `Annotated`

To achieve that, first import:

* `Query` from `fastapi`

*   Added assignments for "Deep Learning with TensorFlow" udacity course

## Bug Fixes and Other Changes

*   Added a versioning framework for `GraphDef`s to ensure compatibility
*   Enforced Python 3 compatibility
*   Internal changes now show up as sensibly separated commits
*   Open-sourced the doc generator
*   Un-fork Eigen
*   Simplified the `BUILD` files and cleaned up C++ headers

     *            initiated by the client (MSIE post requests after successful NTLM SSP
     *            authentication). If false and the user has not been authenticated yet
     *            the client will be forced to send an authentication (server sends
     *            HttpServletResponse.SC_UNAUTHORIZED).
     * @return True if the negotiation is complete, otherwise false
     * @throws ServletException
     */

                request.getRemoteRepositories());

        if (cached != null
                // if the POM has no file, we cached a missing artifact, only return the cached data if no update forced
                && (!request.isForceUpdate() || hasFile(cached.getPomArtifact()))) {
            return cached;
        }

        List<Dependency> dependencies;